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DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: THE INTERSECTION
OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND USE
CONTROLS
Patricia Grace Hammest

I.

INTRODUCTION
Real estate plays an integral role in the United States economy.

It constitutes close to two-thirds of the United States wealth and

represents almost one quarter of its gross national product. I Recent
years have seen a decline in the real estate market. 2 This collapse
has negatively impacted banks and other financial institutions, which
t I would like to express my deep thanks to Professor D. Barlow Burke, Jr. of
the Washington College of Law, American University for introducing me to
the world of real estate and land use and helping me develop this Article. I
am also thankful to Aaron Brown for his editorial help. Finally, thanks are
owed to my parents and Scott Levinson for all of their support and encouragement during the writing of this Article.
1. Adrienne Linsenmeyer, The Worst Market Collapse in Decades, and Its Likely
Repercussions, FIN. WORLD, Nov. 12, 1991, at 26. The 1980s were an extreme
boom period for the real estate development market. This was partly related
to extensive deregulation of bank real estate lending under the Garn-St. Germain
Act of 1982, as well as the availability of huge amounts of investment capital.
Id. The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 abolished loan to value limits for real
estate projects, restrictions on loans for undeveloped land, and the previous
requirement that developers maintain an equity stake in their projects. The
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See
generally Roger M. Zaitzeff & Daniel J. Mette, Investment Powers of Federal
Savings & Loan Associations After Garn-St. Germain, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 591
(1984) (providing complete overview of savings and loan associations' investment powers following passage of Act).
2. See, e.g., Robert L. Clarke, How acc Will Manage, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 4 (linking real estate decline to regional economic collapse);
Eugene J. Marcus, Real Estate Defaults, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1991, at 5 ("With
the collapse of the real estate market in the last few years the grim subject of
dealing with defaults has come upon the market like a tidal wave and these
dire conditions give promise of continuing well into the future. "); Richard D.
Hylton, Real Estate Woes Seen Worsening, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1990, at DI
(predicting continued decline of real estate market related to poor economy
and lack of available credit); Steve Kerch, Developers Hear the Bad News: 90s
to Be Nasty, Cm. TRIB., May 7, 1989, REAL EST., at 1 (reporting speech at
Urban Land Institute seminar, predicting "disastrous" real estate market in
199Os).
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provided much of the funding for the real estate boom of the 1980s. 3
Increasingly, financial institutions are finding themselves faced with
the choice of writing off bad real estate loans or foreclosing on
property not worth the loan that it secures. 4 Lenders are also faced
with additional risks and liabilities not anticipated in making the
original loans.s In response to these risks and liabilities, financial

3. During the 1980s it was not unusual to find banks financing 1000/0 of real
estate development project costs. Linsenmeyer, supra note 1, at 26. Today the
vacancy rate for office space stands at 18.7%. Banks have been forced to
write off large amounts of real estate loans. Linsenmeyer, supra note 1, at 26;
Jerry Knight, Enforcement Action Against Sovran Disclosed, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 1991, at B12 (finding that Sovran Bank has set aside $714 million to
cover real estate write offs); Citicorp: Cutbacks Paying Off, USA TODAY, Sept.
23, 1991, at IB (stating that Citicorp has set aside over one billion dollars to
cover real estate loan losses); James Bates, Real Estate Developers Threat to
State's Banks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1991, at Dl (stating that Bank America
anticipates one billion dollar write off of Security Pacific real estate loans in
merger); see also Hylton, supra note 2 (discussing interaction between real
estate market and banking industry, and indicating that lenders in many
situations are faced with renegotiating loan terms with borrowers). In addition
to write offs, real estate lenders are increasingly foreclosing on property. See,
e.g., David Barry, Lenders Wall In Morocco, Bus. J. SAN JOSE, Oct. 7, 1991,
§ 1, at 1 (discussing numerous foreclosure actions filed since August against
real estate developer for loans ranging from $2 million to $55.8 million);
Charles V. Zehren, Payment Demanded; Lenders Move to Foreclose on Former
Roosevelt Raceway, NEWSDAY, Oct. 4, 1991, at 7 (discussing foreclosure by
lenders of Roosevelt Raceway where real estate developer failed to make
payment of approximately $32 million).
4. See Zehren, supra note 3 (discussing foreclosure of Roosevelt Raceway, which
due to declining real estate values is no longer worth loan it secures); see also
Stephen Kleege, $300 Million Bankruptcy Plan Highlights Plunge in Connecticut, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1990, at 30 (detailing liquidation plan of developer
owing $300 million, secured by properties valued at $130 million).
5. Liability has been imposed upon lenders for environmental clean up costs. See,
e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986) (holding bank obtaining title to hazardous waste disposal site through
foreclosure proceedings, liable for costs associated with clean up under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I) (1988»; United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d
1550 (lith Cir. 1990) (indicating that creditor who engaged in financial management of property is potentially liable for CERCLA clean up costs); United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 20, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(finding issue of fact as to whether lender was sufficiently involved in management of hazardous waste site to subject it to CERCLA liability). See
generally Bernard J. Berry et aI., Superfund Liability for Financial Institutions,
96 COM. L.J. 59 (1991) (examining liability of creditors for environmental clean
up costs associated with secured property used as hazardous waste storage);
Susan C. Geiser, Federal and State Environmental Law: A Trap for the Unwary
Lender, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 643 (1988) (discussing potential imposition of
liability, or effect on priority interests of mortgagee, resulting from state and
federal environmental laws).
Additionally, lenders have been exposed to liability under a number of
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institutions have established a variety of mechanisms designed to
minimize exposure in real estate development lending. 6
In a parallel development to the real estate crisis, local governments have faced increasing fiscal pressure and budget crises as they
confronted cut backs in aid at both the state and federal level
throughout the 1980s. 7 Aggravated by an economic downturn, the
fiscal situation of local governments shows no sign of improving in
the near future. 8 Forced to bear greater portions of the costs assocommon law theories of recovery including breach of a duty of good faith,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. See Frances E. Freund, Note,
Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law Theories, 42 VAND. L. REV: 855
(1989) (surveying traditional and emerging theories of lender liability that have
resulted in multimillion dollar damage awards); A. Barry Cappello & Frances
E. Komoroske, Lender Liability: What Lies Ahead, TRIAL, May 1991, at 68
(examining recent trends in imposition of lender liability in such areas as failed
leveraged buyouts, failing savings and loan associations, and environment). See
also ALVIN L. ARNOLD, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, 1 4.26
(2d ed. 1991) (liability to third parties), 14.27 (liability to borrower),
8.018.06 (liability under CERCLA) (discussing lender liability in construction and
development financing).
6. See Berry et aI., supra note 5, at 73-76 (suggesting different manners in which
lending institutions may limit liability, including performance of "environmental
due diligence" and requiring posting of bonds, guarantees, or maintenance of
environmental clean up insurance as prerequisite to lending); Geiser, supra note
5, at 693-703 (examining role of title insurance and inclusion of warranties and
covenants in mortgage documents as limitations on lender exposure for clean
up costs); N. Sue Van Sant Palmer, Note, Lender Liability and Arbitration,
Preserving the Fabric of Relationship, 42 VAND. L. REV. 947 (1989) (indicating
that imposition of lender liability leads to defensive posture by lending industry
and suggesting that arbitration might provide help in resolving disputes and
reducing liability). See generally ARNOLD, supra note 5, 18.04 (discussing ways
to reduce risks associated with CERCLA liability). See also John A. DeAngelis,
Note, Riches Do Not Last Forever: Real Estate Investment By National Banks,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 786 (discussing recent innovations in real estate
financing including shared appreciation and convertible mortgages to which
the banking industry has turned to reduce its risk and increase returns).
7. John J. Kirlin, The Bargaining Process: Trends and Issues, in MANAGING
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS I, 2 (Rachel L. Levitt
& John J. Kirlin eds., 1985) (discussing changing fiscal situation for local
governments based on enactment of statutory spending limitations, such as
. California's Proposition 13, and decreases in federal aid); Lindsey Gruson,
End of Federal Revenue Sharing Creating Financial Crisis in Many Cities, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1987, § I, at 7 (examining impact of elimination of federal
aid program of general revenue sharing on local governments and finding that
between 1978 and 1985 federal aid to municipalities declined by 22.1 %). See
generally CRISIS AND CONSTRAINT IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE, xvii (James H. Carr
ed. 1984) [hereinafter CRISIS AND CONSTRAINT] (providing general overview of
fiscal situation facing local government and indicating that federal capital
investment has declined 30"70 between 1965 and 1980).
8. Stephen A. Davies, Threat of Economic Downturn Forces City Officials to
Take Stock, BOND BUYER, Dec. 3, 1990, at Al (considering financial situation
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ciated with the creation and maintenance of local infrastructure,
municipalities have developed novel financing devices, which are often
employed through the local land use regulatory scheme. 9 These devices
have served to shift many of the infrastructure costs, historically
born by municipalities in supporting apd absorbing the externalities
associated with private development, to the private developer itself. 10
of local government, in light of combined impact of economic downturn and
cut backs in federal funding on local finances, and finding that federal funding
per capita has declined from $77.95 in 1981-82 to $48.64 in 1987-88).
9. Kirlin, supra note 7, at 21. Municipalities have responded to financial pressures
by developing and expanding upon tax exempt financing and the use of
municipal bonds. /d. (discussing evolution of municipal financing development
techniques in response to cut backs in federal aid); Paul B. Downing, User
Charges and Service Fees, in CRISIS AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 7, at 160-220
(discussing use of user fees both as revenue source and cost reduction mechanism for government services and public facilities); Randy Hamilton, The
World Turned Upside Down-The Contemporary Revolution in State and
Local Government Capital Financing, in CRISIS AND CONSTRAINT, supra note
7, at 200-20 (outlining innovations in state and local government bond markets,
including zero coupon bonds, compound interest bonds, stripped coupon bonds,
tender option (put) bonds and super sinker bonds, as well as new methods of
tax exempt financing, such as tax exempt commercial paper and tax exempt
lease financing).
Additionally, local governments have begun to turn to mechanisms that serve
to transfer the costs of infrastructure development to real estate developers:
See generally Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and
Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
51 (1987) (surveying national development exactions, dedication practices, and
user fees).
10. See Kirlin, supra note 7, at 15-16 (discussing changing roles of public and
private participants, and trends away from traditional role of local government
in supplying infrastructure to real estate development sites and eliminating
surrounding blight conditions); see also Roger D. Feldman et aI., Public-Private
Partnership for Infrastructure Development, Financing Infrastructure: Tools
For the Future (1988), reprinted in 1989 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK
363 (Mark S. Dennison ed.) (providing overview of implementation of publicprivate partnership in provision of community services). See generally David
L. Callies & Malcolm Grant, Paying for Growth & Planning Gain: An AngloAmerican Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact Fees, and Development Agreements, 23 URB. LAW. 221, 221 (1991) (comparing United States
and British experiences in attempting to transfer external costs associated with
real estate development to private developer).
The question remains as to who actually ends up paying for these externalities
in the long run; it seems likely .that the costs are shifted back to the public by
the developer's raising of prices. See Kirlin, supra note 7, at 6 (identifying
effect of shifting of costs to developers as tendency to pass such additional
costs onto tenants of development and to attempt to reduce costs associated
with initial land acquisition); see also Arnold, supra note 5, , 2.03[2)[a]
(discussing impact of fee imposition upon financing process and indicating that
developer has four methods of dealing with added costs: (1) passing costs on
through lease or purchase price; (2) including fee as part of costs; (3) absorbing
costs; or (4) a combination thereof).
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Development agreements are one of the mechanisms created to
define specific area land uses, as well as accomplish the internalization
of real estate development externalities. I I The agreements are essentially contracts entered into by a municipality and a developer, with
each party having corresponding duties and obligations. 12 From the
real estate developer's perspective, the development agreement vests
or conveys a right to develop according to an initial plan 13 in exchange
for the developer's assumption of responsjbility of delineated infrastructure improvements and additions.14 Thus, while the development
agreement may increase the monetary cost of a particular project, IS

11. See Richard Cowart, Experience, Motivations, and Issues, in DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROSPECTS 9, 30 (Douglas R. Porter &
Lindell L. Marsh eds., 1989) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS] (identifying public motivations underlying use of development agreements within
California as related to provision of infrastructure); Douglas R. Porter, The
Relation of Development Agreements to Plans and Planning, in DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra, at 148-49 (evaluating development agreements as alternative planning mechanism); see also infra notes 136-78 and accompanying text
(discussing vested rights doctrine, evolution of development agreements, and
underlying policy rationale).
12. Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 240 (contrasting bilateral nature of development agreements with conditional or contract zoning based on unilateral
covenants); Michael R. Fry, Comment, Modern Development: Vested Rights
or Development Agreements, 55 UMKC L. REV. 483, 484 (1987) (stressing that
mutuality forms essential component of development agreements rendering
them effective); see also infra notes 139, 141, 143 and accompanying text
(discussing contractual nature of development agreement).
13. Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 239 (stating that primary advantage of
development agreements is ability to vest development rights in developer); see
also Lindell L. Marsh, Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note
11, at 2, 3 (asserting that primary purpose of development agreements is "to
assure the developer that the rules of the game will not change").
14. See Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 239 (opining that developer will undertake
additional infrastructure costs in order to ensure certainty of development
rights, rendering development agreements bilateral in nature); Marsh, supra
note 13, at 3 (finding that agreements encourage developer provision of
infrastructure and public benefits, as well as providing "greater predictability
and less risk" in planning and development); see also Cowart, supra note 11,
at 33 (reviewing California experience with development agreements in 10 years
following statutory enactment and finding that "[m]any jurisdictions financed
public infrastructure and services with development agreements"). Cowart's
article provides a summary of a survey conducted by the University of California in 1985-86. This survey found that in a sampling of development
agreements, 57.5070 contained provisions requiring infrastructure or public
facility improvements and 35% required some type of land dedication. Id.; see
also infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing exactions imposed upon
developer).
15.. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 2.03[2][a] (outlining various types of fees and
exactions imposed in subdivision regulation process and asserting that local
government should not "assume that impact fees are simply costs to be absorbed
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it generates a substantial benefit to the developer by freezing the
applicable land use scheme and conveying the right to develop.16
On the other hand, from the municipality's perspective, the
agreement shifts the external costs associated with the increased need
for and demands on public infrastructure to the developer. This
reduces the fiscal pressure placed on the local government. 17 Furthermore, development agreements enhance the municipality's ability
to develop a more complete and comprehensive plan, and ensure that
real estate developers will complete development and its corresponding infrastructure in a timely manner .18 In return for these benefits,
development agreements oblige the local government to maintain or
freeze the zoning or land use scheme, as applied to that specific
piece of property, for a specified period of time. 19

16.

17.

18.

19.

by the developer"). Arnold discusses the effect of impact fees on the financing
process and states that "a fee represents a cost to the developer, and that cost
must be accommodated somewhere in the project." Id.; see also supra note
10 and accompanying text (indicating that developers will attempt to pass costs
associated with exaction onto purchasers or lessees of completed development);
cf. James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice and
Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 95-98 (1987) (discussing the reality
of who absorbs costs associated with different types of exactions and outlining
such factors as uniformity, predictability, and timing of imposition and payment., as factors affecting developer's ability to shift costs forward or backward); Charles Siemon, Who Bears the Cost?, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
115, 126 (1987) (considering implications of additional costs associated with
exactions and impact fees for housing costs and potentially resulting discriminatory impact).
See Fry, supra note 12, at 483-84 (indicating that developer may be required
to expend substantial start up costs that are rendered useless if development
right fails to vest and implying that development agreements minimize risk);
see also infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text (illustrating consequences
posed to development project with no vested right by changing land use scheme).
See supra notes 10, 11, 14, 15 and accompanying text discussing use of
development agreements in requiring developers to provide infrastructure and
public facilities in return for vesting of development rights.
Marsh, supra note 13, at 3-4. Marsh outlines the public purposes underlying
development agreements as:
1. Private absorption of externalities relating to development through
provision of infrastructure and public services;
2. Injection of greater predictability and corresponding reduction in
costs of development;
3. Provision of flexibility in negotiation between public and private
sectors.
Id. Additionally, development agreements may serve as an integral part of the
land use planning process. See Porter, supra note 11, at 148-51 (" [8]y specifying
the phasing and timing of development, in designated areas, development
agreements provide a coordinating mechanism for future capital outlays and
other public actions. ").
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing bilateral nature of
development agreements and primary benefit to developer as vesting of right
to develop).
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This Article proposes that, in addition to the traditional benefits
associated with development agreements, they serve as additional
security in the real estate financing process by eliminating the uncertainty and risk posed by an unstable land use regulatory scheme. In
support of this thesis, this Article argues that, as a vested right,
development agreements convey property rights that increase the value
of the collateral mortgaged in the financing process. Section II
illustrates the problem posed by a· changing land use regulatory
scheme vis-a-vis a developer who has not yet obtained a vested
property right in development. Section II also illustrates the consequences a development agreement may have for the financier of a
real estate development project.
Section III provides an overview of the real estate development
finance process, outlining the risks that confront lenders and that
diminish the availability of credit for real estate development. This
section's focus is primarily on the attendant concerns of construction
financing with stress on the issues raised in real estate component
financing. It concludes with a summary of the lender's remedies
upon default of the mortgagor.
Section IV provides an overview of the legal bases and implications of development agreements. This section outlines the present
regulatory scheme and substantive requirements of development
agreements. In addition, section IV also delineates the traditional
purposes underlying the creation of the development agreement.
Finally, it addresses the constitutional implications of such agreements.
Section V develops the proposition that the proper structuring
of the development agreement will not only extend its traditional
benefits of providing the developer with a vested right and relieving
the municipality of a particular fiscal stress, but it will also enhance
the creditworthiness of the proposed development. The premise of
section V is that a development agreement; to the extent that it
represents a vested right in development, conveys a property interest
to the developer, which enhances the value of the property to be
mortgaged in the financing process. It develops this premise first by
examining and delineating the terms and structure of the development
agreement necessary to render it a viable financeable device, and
second by addressing the issue of enforceability and assignability of
the development agreement by the lender.
II. LAND USE AND THE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
This section delineates the problems that a changing land use
regulatory scheme imposes on the real estate development process.
It also illustrates, from the lender's perspective, the consequences an
inadequately drafted development agreement can create. While the
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consequences illustrated may represent the extreme case, it is clear
that either. the failure to obtain vested rights in the development
process associated with a changing land use regulatory scheme, or
an improperly drafted development agreement, may pose significant
consequences for the real estate financing process.
A.

Changing Land Use Scheme-No Vested Right
Zoning ordinances, comprehensive plans, and subdivision regulations regulate the residential, commercial, and industrial composition of almost every municipality in the United States. 20 Real estate
development projects are also subject to permitting processes. 21 The
various mechanisms governing the zoning and building processes
constitute a municipality's land use scheme. Local legislative and
administrative bodies regulate and control this land use scheme. 22
The scheme is periodically revised through comprehensive rezonings. 23
20. See Mendes Hershman, A Lender Looks at Land Use Controls: The Wonder
World of Fixed and Floating Zones, Subdivision Regulations, and Master Plans
(pts. 1-3), 12 PRAC. LAW. 11, 15 (1966), 13 PRAC. LAW. 51, 75 (1967); cf
Lisa Belkin, Houston Journal: Now That a City Has Grown, The Planning
Begins, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10,1991, at 20 ("Houston is the only major American
city with no zoning regulations .... "). Land use regulations find their genesis
in the common law of nuisance and they developed in response to public
demand for some type of control over sprawling development as well as real
estate's need for assurance of property values. Hershman, pt. 1, supra at 1213; see also DANIEL G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 2.7 (1986) (indicating that
underlying purposes of zoning regulations range from maintenance of property
values, neighborhood stabilization, traffic regulation, limitation on density,
.and promotion of morals, to increasing tax base). New York City enacted the
first comprehensive zoning law in 1916. Id. In 1926, the Supreme Court upheld
such comprehensive land use regulations as valid exercises of the police power.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, §§ 8.1, 8.6 (discussing building
and housing codes, and indicating that "issuance of a building permit is usually
the last point at which the local government can exercise leverage regarding
the type of development that will be permitted in the land"); see also 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988) (requiring federal permit for filling of property
classified as wetlands). The import of the federal permit requirements under
the Clean Water Act on real estate development is the subject of much recent
commentary. See, e.g., Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The

United States Claims Court's New Analysis of Section 404 Taking Challenges,
19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 317 (1991).

22. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, §§ 3.6-3.11 (indicating that
zoning is primarily delegated to local government under state police power).

23. See Paul B. Rodbell & Cathleen F. Ward, Vesting Development Rights in
Maryland, MD. B.J., May/June 1992, at 23 ("The basic method by which
land uses are amended unilaterally by the local zoning authority is through a
comprehensive rezoning of the area. Comprehensive rezoning arises periodically
when the legislative body revises the zoning designations for an area. in light
of the existing land uses and future needs of their community. ").
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In addition, spot or piecemeal zoning may occur on a site specific
basis.24 More recently, local communities have begun to experiment
with a variety of growth control mechanisms, including moratoria2S
and exactions, which impact on the real estate development process. 26
All of this adds up to a complex regulatory scheme that is potentially
subject to change at any point in time. 27 A real estate developer must
comply with the terms of the applicable land use scheme. 28 Furthermore, a real estate project must comply with any subsequent changes
to the applicable land use scheme up until the point at which the
developer obtains a vested right in the development. 29 In other words,
there is no inherent right to a particular zoning classification just
because a developer has commenced a project. 30
24. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, §§ 5.4-5.6 (providing overview
of spot, contract, and piecemeal zoning); see also Judith W. Wegner, Moving
Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and
the Theoretical Foundation of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv.
957, 977-94 (1987) (examining character of such rezoning techniques and
indicating that while traditionally such rezoning was viewed as inherently
suspect, present day trend is towards rejecting per se invalidity and applying
rule of reason).
.
25. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, § 9.5; cf Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (applying constitutional
takings analysis to state statute prohibiting construction on beach front property).
26. The term exactions encompasses user or impact fees as well as land dedications.
An exaction may also require a developer to fund or construct various infrastructure requirements of the proposed development. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, §§ 9.1-9.9 (discussing proliferation of growth
management techniques in response to environmental concerns and budgetary
constraints, based on notion that developers should pay their own way);
Bauman & Ethier, supra note 9, at 57-59 (surveying national practices in
imposition of development exactions and user fees and concluding that 65.9%
of responding communities maintained policy of on-site development exaction,
39.60/0 maintained off-site exaction policy, and 36.4% utilized some type of
impact fee structure).
27. See Robert M. Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving

Large Scale, Multi-Party Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and
Suggestions for Its Application, I J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 451-53 (1985).
28. See Rodbell & Ward, supra note 23, at 22 ("A builder must seek approval for
a project and obtain numerous permits from various authorities, as well as
conform to local land use regulations, numerous zoning ordinance requirements,
and comprehensive plans. ").
29. A developer has no inherent guaranteed or vested right in real estate development. A development is subject to all changing land use laws and regulations
until a right in the development has vested. Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall
Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 373, 390 (1990) (citing cases).
30. See Rodbell & Ward, supra note 23, at 23 ("A property owner does not
acquire a right to a particular zoning designation .... "); cf P-W Investment,
Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P .2d 1365 (Colo. 1982) (holding that com-
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The risks associated with a changing land use regulatory scheme
are substantial and, in fact, act as a deterrent to the availability of
credit with which to finance real estate development. 31 Aveo Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Commission 32 illustrates
the risks posed by a changing regulatory scheme on the development
process, where no vested right to develop has inured. In A yeo, the
developer had incurred close to three million dollars in start-up costs
related to a proposed coastal development project. 33 Subsequent to

pletion of preliminary improvements did not create a vested right or entitlement
to water services).
31. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 3.02[4J (identifying zoning and building requirements as risks to be evaluated in financing real estate construction); see also
supra notes 5, 15 and infra notes 69, 81, 82, 86, 87, 135 and accompanying
text (discussing considerations related to land use regulation in the financing
process). The impact that changes in land use regulation have on the value of
property, or the developer who has commenced development but has no vested
right in the development process, may be extreme. See Bob Lane, County's
Surprise Cost Him $130,OOO-Property Classified as Wetlands, But Nobody
Told Him, SEATTLE TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1991, at Al (recounting story of individual
who purchased property as investment, which was subsequently reclassified as
wetlands, rendering it nearly impossible for him to resell to developer). For a
good discussion of the impact of wetlands legislation on the real estate
development process, see David Gill, The Wetlands Wading Game, Bus. J.N.J., Feb. 1990, at 50 (discussing impact of 1987 wetlands legislation on real
estate development in New Jersey and finding that in one housing development
project up to 120 of 375 planned units may be lost in complying with
requirements); see also Mays-Ott Co. v. Town of Nags Head, 751 F. Supp.
82, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (upholding developer's vested right in partially completed development project but stating that the "expenditures of a substantial
amount of money on the commencement of a project [does notJ create a vested
right to complete the project"); Rita Fitzgerald & Richard Peiser, Santa
Monica's Colorado Place Agreement, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra
note 11, at 40 (discussing well publicized $200 million development project in
California, which experienced numerous problems and delays related to regulatory land use environment). This particular development agreement is discussed further, infra notes 33, 53, 85; cj. Top 10 Changes in Real Estate Over
the Past Decade, Bus. WIRE, Jan. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library
(identifying "exaction zoning" and "zoning for sale" as major developments
in 1980s impacting on real estate industry); Steve Kerch, The War Room:
Predicting Land Value For 10, 15 Years, Cm. TRW., Apr. 22, 1990, at ID
(stating that government policy in area of zoning and land use regulation is
one of key considerations in valuing real estate for land acquisition).
32. 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
33. [d. at 549. These expenditures were made in reliance on the 1972 approval of
a final map for the development, as well as the issuance of an initial permit.
[d. Similarly, in the Colorado Place development project, noted supra note
31, the developer had expended two million dollars in start up costs on a
proposed mixed use project. Fitzgerald & Peiser, supra note 31, at 41. The
developer incurred these costs following the issuance of an initial permit
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the expenditure, but prior to obtaining a building permit, the State
of California enacted the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act
of 1972,34 which created another permit requirement and approval
stage in the proposed development project. 3S The developer sought
an exemption under the Act, claiming a vested right in the proposed
development based on its expenditures made in reliance on prior
zoning and government authorizations. 36 The California Supreme
Court refused to find that the developer had a vested right in the
proposed development and therefore denied the developer's request
for an exemption under the Act. 37 The court noted that the developer
could still pursue the option of complying with the terms of the Act
and attempt to acquire the additional permit. It continued, however,
by stating that "if the application is denied, then the desired buildings
on the tract cannot be constructed during the period the Act is in
effect. "38 Consequently, the developer faced the possibility that it
could never complete the development, notwithstanding its substantial
expenditures and incurred liabilities. 39 The possibility of such consequences obviously poses a substantial risk to potential real estate
lenders: risks that they may not be willing to assume. 40

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

authorizing preconstruction work. [d. Subsequently, a newly elected city council
passed a commercial building moratorium. [d. The developer was faced with
the fact that it had incurred substantial liabilities but no vested right in
continued development. [d. It subsequently entered into negotiations with the
local legislature, which eventually evolved into a development agreement between the municipality and the developer. [d.; see also Prince George's County
v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 330 Md. 297, 300, 623 A.2d 1296, 1298
(1993) (holding that developer who had incurred start up costs of $2,150,845.00
had no vested right in project's development).
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1972) (repealed 1977) (establishing
coastal zone conservation commission and authorizing creation of conservation
plan and permit procedures). The 1972 Act was subsequently repealed and
replaced with the California Coastal Act of 1976. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 30000-39000 (West 1986). See Ward Tabor, The Cali/ornia Coastal Commission and Regulatory Takings, 17 PAC. L.l. 863 (1986) (discussing the
interaction between California coastal legislation and its effect on property
rights).
Avco, 553 P.2d at 548. The permit provision exempted those developers who
had obtained a vested right prior to its enactment. [d.
[d. at 549.
[d. at 557.
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
See supra notes 15, 31 and infra notes 53,81, 82,85,86, 135 and accompanying
text (discussing impact of changing land use regulation on financier's willingness
to extend credit); see also P-W Investment, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655
P .2d 1365, 1367 (Colo. 1982) (evaluating whether vested right had inured in
development where both the developer and lender brought suit in effort to
obtain water and sewer tap hook-ups integral to project's completion).
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B.

Development Agreements-Consequences to the Lender
Development agreements can reduce the risks identified in the
A vco case by freezing the regulatory scheme, and thus implicitly
conveying vested development rights. 41 Nevertheless, as with any
document affecting real property, such an agreement also poses
substantial risks if it is ineffectively drafted.
Mayor oj Rockville v. Walker4 2 illustrates the extreme consequences a development agreement may pose to a lender's security
interest. 43 In Walker, the town of Rockville and the developer entered
into a development agreement, which included a provision transferring municipally owned land to the developer in return for specified
consideration. 44 The agreement further detailed certain terms governing the development. Subsequently, the developer, after obtaining
construction financing,4S failed to comply with the terms of the
development agreement and eventually defaulted on the 10an. 46 In
1988, the court construed the conveyance by development agreement
as a defeasible estate subject to a condition subsequent, vesting the
power of reentry in the municipality upon a breach of the terms of
the agreement by the developer,41 The right of reentry potentially
vested a superior property interest in the city that threatened to
extinguish the lender's security interest in the mortgaged property.48
41. See infra notes 232-41, 251 and accompanying text (proposing that development
agreements create and convey vested property rights and thus inject greater
security into the land use development process).
42. 86 Md. App. 691, 587 A.2d 1179 (1991).
43. In Maryland, there is no statutory basis for development agreements between
local government and private developers; however, the court did not specifically
address the issue of the validity of the agreement itself. In Maryland, there is
common law authority for such development agreements. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976) (construing ordinance as
creating vested contractual right in private party); see also infra notes 152-57
. and accompanying text (discussing Crane case as legal basis for development
agreements) .
44. Walker, 86 Md. App. at 694, 587 A.2d at 1180. For an article discussing the
problems associated with Rockville Metro Center's development and its effect
on a real estate developer, see Rick Greenberg, Busted in Bethesda: The Story
of Roger Eisinger and John Kilbane, Once the Barons of Their Busting
Suburban City, Offers a Lesson In Concentration and Succession, REGARDIES,
Nov. 1990, § 1, at 27.
45. Walker, 86 Md. App. at 694, 587 A.2d at 1180. A deed of trust secured the
loan on the attendant property. Id. Furthermore, the developer never notified
the City of the transaction. Id.
46. Id. The developer defaulted on the loan six months prior to the City's
declaration of the loan to be in default under the terms of the agreement and
the corresponding demand of performance. Id.
47. Hadid Land Dev. Corp. v. Mayor of Rockville, No. 1339, slip op. at 24 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. May 16, 1988).
48. Walker, 86 Md. App. at 695-700, 587 A.2d at 1181-83. The court pursued a
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The lender, in pursuing its right of foreclosure, faced the fact that
the development agreement might render it an unsecured creditor.
The development agreement, however, contained a subordination
clause that delineated the extent to which the agreement would be
subordinated to a financing interest. 49 The case was remanded for
further findings on whether the loan fell within the terms of the
subordination provision, thereby protecting the lender's security interest. so
Walker indicates that an inadequately drafted development agreement may carry the extreme consequence of destroying the mortgagee's security interest in the development. sl This resulted from the
fact that the development agreement directly affected title to the
property in interest. 52 More commonly, the complexity of a development agreement can lead to unexpected breach or default and
thus, impact upon the development's completion. s3 Failure by the
developer to consider a development agreement's implications to a
potential mortgagee's interest in the development may adversely
impact on the developer's ability to obtain financing for the development.
1993]
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discussion of the impact of defeasible estates upon a mortgagee's security
interest and concluded "that a mortgagee's interest similarly ends when a
grantor exercises the power of termination in the case of a fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent." [d. at 669, 587 A.2d at 1183.
49. Walker, 86 Md. App. at 599-704, 587 A.2d at 1183-85. The development
agreement contained a section entitled "Mortgage Financing: Rights of Mortgage Holders." [d. at 701, 587 A.2d at 1183. This section of the agreement
permitted financing through a mortgage or lien on the property, but only to
the extent that the funds were used for improvements to that particular
property, while not exceeding the purchase price. [d. at 703, 587 A.2d at 1184.
50. [d. at 703, 587 A.2d at 1185 (finding insufficient evidence to determine whether
the loan was authorized under the agreement).
51. See id. at 700, 587 A.2d at 1183 ("[TJhe mortgage terminated when the City
re-entered the property and title revested in it."). Scrutton v. County of
Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), provides an interesting
analogy contrast to the court's decision in Walker. In Scrutton, a landowner
appealed a conditional rezoning of her property. [d. at 875. While the court
upheld the rezoning as within the police power, it struck down a reversion
clause within the rezoning amendment. [d. at 878-79. The court held that such
a clause would in fact constitute a second rezoning, which was procedurally
. and substantively invalid. [d. The zoning reversionary clause at issue in Scrutton
is analogous to the right of reentry under the Walker agreement. Thus these
two cases represent inapposite results that could impact on the enforceability
of the development agreement and its attendant consequences for a lender.
52. Walker, 86 Md. App. at 697-700, 587 A.2d at 1182-83 (discussing impact of
development agreement as extinguishing defeasible estate following breach of
conditions).
53. See Fitzgerald & Peiser, supra note 31, at 41-45 (analyzing complex development
agreement, corresponding pitfalls, and delays, including subsequent renegotiation of agreement); see also infra notes 229-44 and accompanying text (discussing remedies associated with breach of development agreement).
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III.

FINANCING REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
Real estate development proceeds through a series of phases,
each with its own corresponding financing component. 54 The development process may be undertaken and completed by one developer
or, in the alternative, different developers may assume responsibility
for each particular component. 55 The initial stage of development is
land acquisition. The developer most often finances this through a
first-mortgage land loan secured by the property acquired. 56 Following
land acquisition, the developer usually seeks funding for both land
development and construction. 57 Finally, upon completion of the
development, the developer will attempt to obtain permanent or
"takeout" financing. 58 This next section provides an overview of the
real estate financing process. It attempts to identify the key concerns
of lenders as they evaluate a loan application for a development
project. The potential success of the project is of utmost importance
to the developer because it is this success that will form the basis
for repayment of the loan. This overview identifies and discusses key
aspects of the financing process potentially implicated, or carrying
consequences for, the negotiations of a development agreement.

A.

Land Development and Construction Financing
Construction and land development financing represent the interim stage of the development financing process. 59 The construction
54. RICHARD HARRIS, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING, at v (1st ed.
1982).

55. Id.
56. ARNOLD, supra note 5, " 1.01, 1.06. Additional methods of funding land
acquisition include financing by the seller, id. , 1.08, and installment landpurchase contracts, id. , 1.09. Traditionally, financing is obtained from institutional lenders such as commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and
mortgage bankers. Id. , 1.10. Because of problems associated with the valuation
of raw acreage, which is usually the subject of the initial land acquisition
financing, the modern trend is towards combining land acquisition financing
with development and construction financing in a project financing package.
Id. , 1.05; see also id. '4.08 (discussing advantages, disadvantages, and
structuring of project financing). See generally David E. Grogan, Acquisition,

Development, and Construction Loans: Some Implications oj Equity Financing,
73 VA. L. REV. 243 (1987) (evaluating accounting, regulatory, and lenderliability implications of ADC loans).
57. HARRIS, supra note 54, at vii-x.
58. HARRIS, supra note 54, at viii. Takeout or permanent financing is generally a
long term loan that is used to repay the construction loan and to act as long
term financing for the project. ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 5.01. For a comprehensive discussion of the nature, structure and role of permanent financing,
see id. " 5.03-5.04.
59. ARNOLD, supra note 5, "2.01, 3.01, 5.01. Such financing is primarily of short
or intermediate length, and is eventually "taken out" by permanent financing.
Id.; see also supra notes 54, 58 and accompanying text.
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and land development phases are actually two separable components
in the essential stage of turning raw acreage into developed and
usable property. 60 Development agreements are integrally linked to
the construction of a particular project. This section examines the
financing concerns implicated in this stage of real estate development.
1.

Land Development Financing

Land development encompasses the legal,61 engineering,62 and
physical processes63 that render raw acreage into land which is ready
for construction. None of these processes are likely to create a vested
right in the proposed project. 64 It is at this stage, however, that the
developer would enter into development agreement negotiations with
a municipality and thereby obtain an early vested right. Financing
for land development is usually secured by the property to be
developed. 6s A number of factors are important to a lender in
evaluating a land development loan application, including valuation
of the property,66 protection from mechanic's liens,67 and subordination of any prior encumbrances, primarily the land acquisition
loan. 68 The lender must also ensure itself that, in the event of
borrower default, it can obtain rights to any land use approvals or
permits that have been issued to the developer. 69
Another concern to the land development lender is the existence
of subdivision regulations. Subdivisipn regulations are similar to
development agreements in that local governments utilize these re60. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 2.01[1).
61. Legal prerequisites to the commencement of construction include the completion
of annexation, the ascertainment of zoning status, and procurement of any
necessary exceptions or permits. [d.
62. The land development engineering processes encompass surveying, subdivision
(platting), and planning of general layout prior to the start up of construction.
[d.

63. A number of physical improvements will have to be undertaken prior to
construction, including installation of requisite infrastructure, grading, and
landscaping. [d.
64. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Nashia, 321 A.2d 593 (N.H. 1974) (examining expenditures
on architectural and engineering services, and finding no vested right); Smith
v. Juillerat, 119 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio 1954).
65. HARRIS, supra note 54, 1 2.2.
66. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 2.02[1) (indicating that at land development stage it
is still difficult to value property following improvements).
67. [d. 11 2.02[l)[b), 2.02[2)[b) (discussing entitlement of professionals and contractors, employed to carry out completion of development stage, to protection
of mechanic's liens).
68. [d. 1 2.02[4).
69. [d. 12.02[3) ("Carefully drafted land development loan documents will require
an assignment by the borrower of its rights in all governmental applications .... ").
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gulations to impose exactions on the developer. 70 The financing needs
of the developer, therefore, will include expenses necessitated by the
regulations' requirements. 71 One method often used to ensure completion of the exaction requirements, as well as protect the interests
of the developer, lender, and municipality, is the use of a subdivision
improvement agreement. 72 This agreement may provide for notice to
the lender upon the developer's failure to comply with the terms and
requirements of the regulatory exaction. 73 Furthermore, it may provide the lender with an opportunity to rectify such default. 74 The
subdivision improvement agreement helps ensure performance to the
municipality while protecting the different parties' rights and expressly providing remedies in the case of default, thereby lowering
the risk to lenders posed by subdivision regulations. 75
2.

Construction Loans

A construction loan is a "loan made on the security of a real
estate mortgage, the proceeds of which are disbursed gradually to
pay the cost of construction and other improvement to the real estate
as construction progresses. "76 Construction loans carry a high degree
of risk,77 namely that the developer will be unable to complete the
70. Compare Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority For Municipal Subdivision
Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (1990) (tracing
history of subdivision exactions and arguing for broad construction of state
enabling legislation to encompass such actions by local government) with
Cowart, supra note II, at 29-32 (concluding that over 50070 of development
agreements impose some type of exaction on developer).
71. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 2.03 (examining implications for lender of
exactions imposed by subdivision ordinances and concluding such expenses
constitute part of project cost); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing who ultimately bears increased costs associated with exactions).
72. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 2.04(5). Alternative methods of insuring developer
performance of exaction requirements include surety bonds, id. 12.04(1); use
of cash deposits or escrows, id. 12.04(2); property escrows, id. ,2.04(3); and
letters of credit, id. 1 2.04(4).
73. [d. 12.04(5), form 2.1. Subdivision improvement agreements are not common,
but they provide several advantages over traditional guarantees utilized in the
subdivision exactions process. [d. Their primary advantages are related to their
flexibility in design, as well as their ability to protect the lender from cost
overruns or diversion of funds. [d.
74. [d. 1 2.04(5), form 2.1 ("Should any Event of Default occur, lender may at
its option, undertake to cure such Event of Default. ").
75. [d. 12.04(5); see also id. 12.04(5), form 2.1 (providing exemplary subdivision
improvement agreement that allows lender or municipality opportunity to cure
default, or in the alternative, permitting lender to halt disbursement of funds
upon breach by municipality or developer).
76. [d. 1 3.01(1).
77. See id. 1 3.02 (delineating business and legal risks associated with construction
loans as: use of land and buildings under construction as security; unforeseeable
risks associated with construction, such as labor difficulties; intervening liens
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propcrsed development. 78 Because of the risks associated with construction financing, the loan approval process tends to be both long
and assiduous,79 generating a complex, detailed loan agreement. 80 The
construction lender will attempt to ensure the security of its loan by
requiring, prior to lending any funds, a letter that provides for
takeout or permanent financing. 81 It has become increasingly apparent, however, that these commitments often provide inadequate protection. 82
The potential repercussions of a default under the construction
loan are substantial from the lender's perspective: the value of the
loan and securing collateral is predicated upon completion of construction. 83 In the event of default, the lender, in an effort to minimize

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.
83.

and rights of third parties; zoning and building requirements; potential loss of
permanent financing; and improper or poor marketing of finished project); see
also JAMES H. BOYKIN, FINANCING REAL ESTATE 325-26 (1979) (outlining major
risks attendant to construction financing as failure of developer to complete
proposed development; potential for intervening or outstanding liens on property to undermine collateral value; poor marketing analysis rendering project
unattractive to proposed end user; and inadequate funding for completion of
project).
The implication of these risks is that the property that secures the mortgage is
the land and proposed buildings. Thus, the commencement and subsequent
failure to complete construction may reduce the value of the property. ARNOLD
supra note 5, 11 2.02, 3.02[2].
See, e.g., id. 11 3.03, 3.05 (discussing evaluation and financial analysis associated with determination of project feasibility); Construction Lending, CREATIVE REAL EST. FIN. 583, 585-88 (1989) (providing checklist of concerns
associated with entering into a construction loan, including ability and experience of developer, as well as financial status and value of proposed development); BoYKIN, supra note 77, at 329-30 (indicating that proposed mortgagee
will carefully scrutinize financial status of developer and project prior to loan
commitment) .
See BOYKIN, supra note 77, at 332 (detailing rights and obligations to be
delineated within construction loan agreement); see also ARNOLD, supra note
5, 1 4.06 (viewing construction loan agreement as contract that regulates and
protects rights and obligations of borrowers, as well as providing outline of
contents to be included in agreement). Lenders also attempt to limit the risks
associated with construction financing by delineating the terms and conditions
associated with the loan through the use of a commitment letter. ARNOLD,
supra note 5, 14.06 (stating that the commitment letter acts as binding contract
between borrower and lender).
See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 11 3.03[3], 5.01 (discussing role of permanent
financing commitment as security for construction loan, but indicating that
function may be more illusory than real). Other methods of assurance may be
required by the lender prior to entering into a loan commitment. See, e.g., id.
1 4.16 (construction loan guarantees); id. 14.17 (performance and payment
bonds); id, 14.19 (hazard and liability insurance).
See id. 1 5.01 ("[C]onstruction loan default by the borrower owing to some
misfortune or delay during the construction process will probably relieve the
lender from its obligation under the terms of its commitment.").
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.1
(2d ed. 1985). See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 11 3.02[1], 6.01 (indicating that land
with partially constructed fixture is worth less than vacant property).

136

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 23

its exposure, will pursue a course of action that will permit the
completion of construction. 84• A variety of factors will impact upon
the lender's ability to complete construction. 8s Among these factors
is the threat posed by a change in the local government land use
scheme, which potentially could undermine the development of the
property86 and may be the cause of the default in the first place by
rendering development infeasibleY Thus, the stability of the applicable land use scheme will be of great concern to the lender.
It is the premise of this Article that development agreements, if
properly structured, act to limit the risks associated both during the
construction process and on default by freezing the land use scheme
which would vest a right in development in the developer or potentially the lender.

B.

Real Estate Component Financing

Traditionally, real estate loans were secured by a mortgage on
the fee simple estate; however, this is less true today. 88 Rather, a
84. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 3.02[1]; see id. 16.03[1] (finding that all lender
action, following default, is aimed at achieving completion of construction in
order to avoid material impairment of value of collateral).
85. Depending on the course pursued by the lender, contracts, permits, leases, and
takeout commitments may impact on the lender's ability to complete construc- .
tion in the planned and profitable manner. See supra notes 15, 81-82 and infra
notes 86, 89, 117-35 and accompanying text (discussing advantages and disadvantages to lender in pursuing different courses of action following borrower
default). Furthermore, the lender will face the same risks that are posed to the
developer. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (identifying risks involved
in construction process). Finally, by becoming involved in the construction
process the lender opens itself up to a variety of liabilities. See ARNOLD, supra
note 5, 16.06[4]; see also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (outlining
potential lender liability as "owner or operator" under CERCLA).
86. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 3.04 (indicating that delay in completion of
construction may render completion impracticable because of rezoning, and
further indicating that partially completed structure may constitute nuisance
subject to condemnation); [d. 1 2.02 (suggesting that properly drafted loan
agreement will include provision for assignment of borrower's rights in governmental permits to lender in case of default as protection of lender's security
interest); see also supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text (illustrating problems posed by changing land use regulatory scheme on real estate development
process).
87. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (reviewing Avco Community
Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977), where court held that failure to comply
with regulation or receive valid waiver would bar developer from completing
project).
88. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, § 1.2 (exploring historical evolution
of mortgage from Anglo-Saxon practice of fee simple conveyance, subject to
a condition subsequent, to present day mortgage law); see also Richard J.
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mortgage may attach to any real property interest, including a
leasehold estate. 89 To the extent that a development agreement constitutes a real property interest and is used as security in the financing
process, it resembles component financing. 90 This section provides a
brief overview of the financing of various real estate interests or
components with a particular focus on a mortgage attaching to a
leasehold interest.
Real estate components may be either physical 91 or legal92 in
nature. The underlying problem that confronts a lender and developer
in attempting to mortgage a particular component of a larger estate
is the need to ensure that the component may be alienated and used
separately from the larger estate. 93 An examination of lender concerns
pertinent to leasehold mortgages illustrates many of the considerations
and problems associated with real estate component financing.
1.

Leasehold Financing

Leasehold mortgages, or financing secured by some type of long
term lease,94 are a type of financing provided to the developer-lessee

89.

90.
91.

92.

93.

94.

Kane, Introduction, CREATIVE REAL EST. FIN. 11, 15 (1991) (indicating that
creation of "layered estates" and corresponding development rights in real
property is one factor leading to increased complexity in real estate financing);
Robert A. Thompson, Financing oj Real Estate Components, CREATIVE REAL
EST. FIN. 561 (1991) (outlining concerns related to financing secured by property
interest that constitutes less than fee simple).
STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL EST. TRANSACTIONS, § 9.44 (1989) ("A
mortgage or deed oj trust is any written instrument creating a lien on real
property."). See WILLIAM ATTEBERRY, MODERN REAL EST. FIN. 1 (1976) (delineating mortgageable interest as inclusive of "rental income, dower interest,
estate for years or leaseholds, in addition to fee ownership"); Steven R.
Davidson, Leasehold Financing: The Lender's Evaluation oj a Tenant's or
Landlord's Interest in a Lease, CREATIVE REAL EsT. FIN. 567 (1991) (discussing
concerns attendant to financing of leasehold estate).
See supra note 24 and injra notes 232-40, 251 and accompanying text (positing
that development agreement conveys property right in development as discrete
property interest).
William R. Theiss, Financing oj Real Estate Components, CREATIVE REAL EST.
FIN. 565, 567-72 (1990) (citing air and mineral rights as examples of physical
components). Furthermore, the physical component may consist of a horizontal
section of the development. Id. at 567 (citing one part of phased development
as example).
Id. (citing leasehold interest or interest of co-tenant as examples of legal
components).
Id. ("[R]egardless of what type of component financing is used [there] is, the
necessity to provide for sufficient rights so that each component, whether
physical or legal, can be owned, transferred, and used independently of the
other components. ").
Davidson, supra note 89, at 569. Such financing may consist of either a ground
lease or a long term lease of improvements. Id. at 569 n.l; see ARNOLD, supra
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for the construction of buildings or improvements. 95 The use of the
lease as the collateral for the loan can lead to two outcomes that
will be of great concern to the lender. First, an act of the lessor can
terminate the lease, eliminating the security for the loan. 96 Second,
the developer-lessee may default under the loan agreement, thus
placing the lender in the position of the lessee, and thereby subjecting
the lender to the terms of the lease. 97 To address concerns posed by
either of these alternative outcomes, the lender, in determining whether
to extend financing to the lessee, will carefully scrutinize the terms
of the lease that secures the loan. 98
Because the terms of the lease are essential in determining the
availability of financing, the lessor and lessee must design the lease
in a manner that renders it financeable. 99 Ideally, the parties should
consult the lender during the negotiation process. 1OO Terms that
deserve specific consideration include the duration of the lease,lol title
assurances through subordination agreements,102 conditions pertaining
to the alienability or assignability of the leasehold,103 provisions
note 5, 17.02 (differentiating between mortgage secured by long term leasehold
estate and mortgage secured by fee title based on subordination of fee to
mortgage lien).
95. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 7.02 (indicating that such improvements include
department stores, shopping centers, and "satellite stores").
96. Davidson, supra note 89, at 569. The leasehold estate, created by the lease,
serves as the collateral for the loan. Thus, a termination of the lease destroys
the corresponding estate. [d. Similarly, the occurrence of a condition subsequent
terminates a defeasible estate and may have an analogous effect on a lender's
security interest. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussing effect
of development agreement creating defeasible estate upon mortgagee's interest).
97. Davidson, supra note 89, at 570.
98. [d.
99. See id. at 571-72 (indicating that structuring lease may be problematic because
of attempts to negotiate with presence of. "phantom" third party. lender).
100. [d. at 572 (acknowledging that this is often impossible because financing has
not yet been sought at time of lease drafting, or because of potential involvement of subsequent lenders based on changing need of project).
101. [d. at 572-74. The duration of the lease impacts on its value as security because
, the shorter the term the less likely that any party will be willing to assume it.
[d. Related to examining the duration of the lease, will be a review of any
provision governing its renewability, which will impact on its value to the
lender. [d.
102. [d. at 575-76, 583-84 (identifying need to ensure priority of leasehold mortgage
over mortgage secured by fee because alternative is that default of fee mortgage
would extinguish leasehold security; and indicating that this may be accomplished through a non-disturbance and subordination agreement). Under a nondisturbance agreement, the fee mortgagee agrees to recognize the leasehold
estate in the event of its assumption of the underlying fee. [d. at 575. Such
an agreement is voidable, however, in the event of bankruptcy proceedings;
thus, a subordination provision may be required. [d.
103. [d. at 576-79. "Most often, however, the leasehold mortgagee will not be
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regulating default and corresponding remedies,l04 operating covenants,105 and specifications regarding disposition of condemnation or
insurance proceeds. 106
2.

Assignment of Rents as Collateral
In the alternative, a lease may enable a developer-lessor to secure
financing for improvements or construction on the fee simple. I07 A
lender may accept an assignment of the flow of income from rents
as part of the collateral or security underlying the financing. 108 Rent
represents a "sure" source of cash flow that can be used to service
the mortgage debt. 109 While an assignment of rents as part of the
security for a loan does not pose the dangers that leasehold financing
does, it still poses a number of risks and considerations that the
lender will wish to address prior to committing to financing. IIO

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.
109.

110.

satisfied unless there are no restrictions on subsequent transfers of a tenant's
interest in the ground lease since restrictions will affect the marketability and
therefore the value of that interest." Id. Assignability is of particular importance because without it the lender will have no way of succeeding to its
security interest in the event of borrower default. Id. at 572. Furthermore,
such assignability may be essential to the ultimate realization of profit from
the proposed construction. See id. at 579 (indicating that motivation behind
improvement is ultimate sublet to commercial tenant).
Id. at 579-81 (indicating that financeable lease will provide for notice and
opportunity to cleanse defect by lender in case of borrower default under terms
of lease; and further exploring utilization of "new lease" provision that allows
mortgagee to enter into new lease in event of borrower default under initial
lease).
Id. at 585-87. Operating covenants are those that regulate the use of the
leasehold estate. Id. at 585 (noting that lender may require exemption from
stringent operating covenants in event of succession to lease because such
conditions may render it infeasible to utilize leasehold in valuable manner).
Id. at 581-82 (requiring participation right to condemnation or insurance
proceeds in event that lease is rendered unusable).
Davidson, supra note 89, at 569-70. See, e.g., Harry B. Hyde, The Real Estate
Lease as a Credit Instrument From the Lender's Viewpoint, COM. REAL EST.
LEASES 153 (1988) (examining use of leases as credit instruments in ensuring
mortgagor's ability to service debt based on proceeds generated by rents); Brian
J. Strum, The Mortgagee Looks At the Lease As a Basis For Mortgage
Financing, COM. REAL EST. LEASES 267 (1991) (identifying use of income
produced by leases as method of appraising value of property and exploring
lenders' concerns related to such financing); Caryl B. Welborn, An Analysis
of Commercial Space Leases from the Perspective of a Secured Lender, COM.
REAL EST. LEASES 21 (1991) (outlining purpose and scope of lender analysis
and specifically addressing issues related to nondisturbance and attornment
agreements in insuring flow of income from leases to service debt).
See Hyde, supra note 107, at 155 (indicating that use of lease as credit
instruments arises from lender's desire to ensure secured and fixed rate of
return on investment).
[d.
See id. at 156-57 (identifying lender concerns in lease as related to tenant's
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As with leasehold financing, a lender will approach the lease"
from two perspectives. 11 I First, because the lease represents the terms
that determine the flow of income through rent, the lender will be
concerned with provisions that disrupt this cash flow, .potentially
disrupting the borrower's ability to service the debt. 1I2 This includes,
among other things, the financial status of the tenant. 113 Second, as
is the case of leasehold financing, the lender will be concerned with
the possibility that, upon default by the borrower, it will step into
the lessor's shoes. 1I4 The lender will focus on the terms of the lease
that would define its duties and rights as a landlord. liS These are the
same terms implicated in leasehold financing.u 6
C.

Borrower Default, Remedies, and Subordination

There are three principal options open to a mortgagee upon
default by the borrower: 1I7 foreclosure of the mortgage, a deed in

111.

112.

113.
114.
115.
116.

117.

credit and provisions governing landlord-tenant relationship as well as mortgagee's ability to enforce lease and succeed to lessor position); see also
Davidson, supra note 89, at 569-70 (stating that while use of cash flow generated
by leases as additional security does not leave lender open to extinguishment
of security interest, it may still pose substantial pitfalls to lender).
See supra notes 89, 96, 104, 106 and infra notes 112, 116 and accompanying
text (delineating lender concerns related to interruption of income from rents,
as well as potential succession into shoes of lessor resulting from borrower
default); cj. supra notes 89, 96, 104, 106 and infra notes 112, 116 and
accompanying text (identifying concerns of lender involved in leasehold financing as potential destruction of security interest, as well as succession to
role of lessee, in event of borrower default).
See Davidson, supra note 89, at 591 (indicating that lender, in reviewing lease
and corresponding income stream as source of collateral, will be concerned
with provisions in lease that might provide for termination, reductions or
offsets of rents, and other costly obligations to the lender).
Hyde, supra note 107, at 156 (stating that in assessing credit support provided
by lease, lender will look at tenant's credit rating, amount of rent, length of
lease and potential volume of business generated by tenant).
Davidson, supra note 89, at 591.
Id.
See id. (delineating provisions pertaining to duration, operating covenants,
subordination, insurance and condemnation proceeds, and lease assignability
as key concerns of mortgagee). Attornment and nondisturbance provisions will
be essential in providing assurance to the lender, that in the event of borrower
default, the leases and corresponding income stream will continue in effect.
See Welborn, supra note 107, at 26-32 (providing model subordination, nondisturbance and attornment agreement).
Default under the terms of the mortgage may occur in a number of different
ways. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.02 (dividing danger signs indicating
default of construction mortgage into two distinct categories: nonpayment and
nonmonetary events); see also ATTEBERRY, supra note 89, at 31 (indicating that
mortgage default may also occur through failure to pay taxes or insurance
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workout. lIs

lieu of foreclosure, or a real estate
There are advantages
and disadvantages associated with each of these alternatives. 1I9 This
section will provide a brief overview of these advantages and disadvantages.
Foreclosure is the traditional response to the borrower's default
under the mortgage agreement. 120 Foreclosure provides the lender
with either title to the property or rights of possession.1 21 In addition,
it eliminates junior liens on the property, allowing the borrower to
take title free and clear. 122 Foreclosure, however, has a number of

118.

119.

120.

121.

122.

premiums, or through breach of covenants in mortgage instrument). Some of
the events that indicate a developer is in default include a situation where
construction costs exceed amount of loan outstanding, indicating that project
may be in jeopardy; construction delay that may result in a number of problems,
precipitating default; diversion of loan proceeds to projects other than the one
being financed; and developer bankruptcy. ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.02. The
risk associated with developer bankruptcy is particularly ominous in financing
secured by a leasehold estate because this constitutes an executory contract and
thus is within the power of the trustee to reject. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). For
a general exploration of the risk posed to a mortgagee's security interest, by
application of § 365 to a lessor, see William E. Winfield, Rejection oj
Nonresidential Leases of Real Property in Bankruptcy: What Happens to the
Mortgagee's Security Interest?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 429 (1990).
See generally ARNOLD, supra note 5, 11 6.04-6.07 (outlining advantages and
disadvantages associated with different lender remedies in event of borrower
default). In addition to these three common methods, the mortgagee may have
other options available to recover its loan. See id. 1 6.08 (identifying loan
guarantee as potential source of recovery, but indicating that in construction
loans such guarantees are more illusory than real).
See supra notes 15, 82, 86, 89, 117 and infra note 135 and accompanying text
(exploring advantages and disadvantages associated with foreclosure, deeds in
lieu of transactions, and workouts, and concluding that workouts are generally
the most appropriate remedy in construction loan context).
See ATTEBERRY, suprq. note 89, at 31-36 (providing historical overview of
mechanisms for dealing with borrower default, including comprehensive chart
detailing methods of foreclosure on state by state basis); see also ARNOLD,
supra note 5, 1 6.04 (indicating that while the most obvious remedy for
borrower default is foreclosure, it may not be the most appropriate remedy in
a construction loan context). Foreclosure may take a number of forms: strict
foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, or power of sale foreclosure. See generally
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, §§ 7.9-7.30 (detailing different types of
foreclosure and corresponding requirements).
See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.04 (indicating that among chief advantages of
foreclosure is ability of lender to either take title and subsequently sell property,
or entitling lender to possession, thus enabling it to complete construction).
See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, §§ 4.24-4.32 (exploring "mortgagee
in possession" rule and indicating that in many jurisdictions mortgagee is
entitled to possession of collateral property in event of borrower default).
ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.04; cf, id. 16.04[2) (indicating that elimination of
junior liens may not be an easy process and delineating defenses available to
such lien holders including assertion of equitable lien status, estoppel, and"
usury).
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disadvantages, including expense and delay.123 In the case of land
development and construction financing, foreclosure may also terminate contracts and obligations associated with the development, as
well as a takeout commitment. l24 This could potentially extend to an
ill-drafted development agreement. All of these potential problems
increase the risk to the mortgagee that the proceeds from the sale of
the collateral will be insufficient to recoup enough money to satisfy
the outstanding loan.12s
A deed in lieu of foreclosure is often a lender's preferred course
of action when faced with default on a land development or construction loan.126 Many of the disadvantages associated with traditional foreclosure are not presented by deed in lieu of foreclosure
transactions. 127 Deeds in lieu of foreclosure, however, pose other
problems. 128 One potential problem is judicial construction of the
deed in lieu of foreclosure as an equitable mortgage. This returns
the mortgagee to its original position and will require that the lender
bring a subsequent foreclosure action imposing the aforementioned
costs and delays of foreciosures.1 29 Furthermore, in the event of
123.

124.

125.
126.

127.
128.

129.

NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, § 7.11. See generally ARNOLD, supra note
5, , 6.04 (delineating disadvantages associated with foreclosure as expense,
delay, adverse publicity, and loss of continuity of work, as well as fact that
foreclosure often fails to result in loan repayment).
ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 6.04. In the case of construction loans, it is in the
lender's best interest for the project to be completed. Id. , 6.03[1). Foreclosure
may substantially delay, as well as add cost to this process. Id. , 6.04. This is
particularly true because often the defaulting developer is the best man to
complete the project. Id. , 6.04.
Id.; see supra notes 77-78, 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing interrelationship between completion of construction and value of property securing
loan).
ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 6.05. A deed in lieu of foreclosure occurs where the
mortgagor delivers title to the mortgaged premises in consideration for cancellation of the mortgage debt. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, § 6.18.
See ARNOLD, supra note 5, ,6.05[2) (indicating that deed in lieu of foreclosure
is generally inexpensive, and nonpublic, in direct contrast to high cost and
adverse publicity often associated with foreclosure).
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, § 6.19 (contrasting simplicity of deed
in lieu of foreclosure as recovery mechanism, with potentially complex and
problematic results). See generally ARNOLD, supra note 5, ,6.05[2) (identifying
disadvantages inherent in deeds in lieu of foreclosure as required concessions
to borrower; potential construction as equitable mortgage; and potential for
merger resulting in subordination of lender's interest to those of junior lien
holders). A major problem may be the negotiation of terms governing the deed
in lieu of foreclosure, because the lender's interest will be in direct conflict
with that of the borrower. Id. , 6.05[3).
ARNOLD, supra note 5, , 6.05[2)[b). See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83,
§ 3.4 (discussing historical evolution of equitable mortgage from practice of
utilizing two separate documents to affect a condition of defeasance on an
estate); id. § 6.19 (indicating that a court may construe deed in lieu of
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bankruptcy, a substantial possibility exists that the deed in lieu of
foredosure will be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. 130 Careful
drafting of the deed, however, may serve to limit either of these
scenarios, rendering this a satisfactory alternative to foreclosure. 131
Finally, real estate workouts have gained increasing popularity
as a mechanism for dealing with the threatened default of real estate
development 10ans.132 Because the value of the collateral securing a
real estate development loan is often contingent upon the development's completion, it may be in the lender's interest to negotiate an
arrangement with the developer that will ensure completion of the
project. 133 The lender and developer accomplish this through a renegotiation of some of the terms of the original loan, enabling the
developer to successfully complete construction. 134 Real estate wor-

130.

131.

132.

133.

134.

foreclosure as separate mortgage transaction, as opposed to conveyance by
absolute deed).
ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.05[2][d]. For a general discussion of the effect of
bankruptcy on a mortgagee's interest, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83,
§§ 8.12-8.17. "[T]ransfers made by debtor within one year of bankruptcy may
be set aside by the trustee if they were made with the intent to hinder, delay
or defraud any creditor." NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 83, § 8.13
See SAFT, supra note 89, § 6.46 (discussing trend towards restructuring defaulted
mortgage as response to increasing inability of foreclosure to serve as method
of repaying loan, and indicating that underlying rationale is ability to further
completion of construction as well as avoid adverse publicity that might
ultimately impact on value of project).
See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.06 (indicating that foreclosure or deed in lieu
of foreclosure places lender in developer's shoes, subjecting it to corresponding
obligations and liabilities that are not in lender's best interest; also indicating
that workout may serve as most effective solution for completion of construction).
See supra notes 78, 83 and accompanying text (concluding that value of security
is inherently linked to completion of proposed project). In addition, the lender
may pursue a workout, subsequent to foreclosure, by entering into a workout
arrangement with a new developer. See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 16.07 (exploring
lender's options in event of succession through foreclosure or deed in lieu of
foreclosure to property with partially completed construction and indicating
that because of inability of lender to act as real estate developer, the lender
may choose to complete project by entering into an arrangement with a "new
borrower"). The other option that is open to a developer, is a quick sale of
the incomplete project. This sale, however, may result in a loss on the loan.
Id. 16.07.
See ARNOLD, supra note 5, 1 6.06[1] (stating that effective real estate workout
with developer may require concessions from lender, including loan extension,
interest adjustments and continued, additional funding). Despite the need to
agree to certain terms that will enable and encourage the developer to stay
involved with, and complete the project, a workout agreement may contain
provisions that enhance a lender's position in the project. Id. 16.06[2]. Thus,
the lender may take more active control of the direction and management of
the project, may require additional collateral, or may be able to subordinate
the future profits of the development in order to insur~ a dedicated source of
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kouts are cheaper and more efficient than foreclosure and they
eliminate many of the construction problems associated with deeds
in lieu of foreclosure. They also allow the developer to complete the
project and thus enable the lender to recoup more of its investment. 135
This section has attempted to delineate some of the;; key concerns
and issues involved in real estate development financing. Focusing
on real estate component financing, it indicates that the mortgagee
is primarily concerned with ensuring and maintaining the value of
its collateral. The priority of the mortgagee in construction financing
is the completion of the proposed project. To this end the mortgagee
will seek to do everything in its power to structure the agreement so
as to protect its interest and ensure completion of the project.

IV.

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS

As local governments have developed increasingly complex land
use regulations, 136 growing uncertainty has confronted real estate
developers in the development process. 137 In an effort to inject some
degree of certainty into real estate development, as well as to provide
a framework for public-private coordination of the development
process, local governments have turned increasingly to the use of

repayment of the loan. See id. (enumerating these potential enhancements to
lender's position, as well as potential for requiring additional guarantees, and,
perhaps most importantly, a clause that provides for automatic reversion of
the property to lender in the event of workout default).
135. Id. , 6.06(2). While there are numerous advantages associated with the real
estate workout process, the process also poses a number of disadvantages. In
negotiating a real estate workout arrangement, it is important to take into
consideration the positions of junior lien holders. [d. , 6.06[4][b). Additionally,
workouts raise the potential application of the obligatory advance rule that
may undermine the priority of the lender's interest. [d. 16.06[4][c]. Perhaps
most importantly, the lender's increased involvement in the real estate development process may increase its exposure to liability associated with the
development. Id. , 6.06[4][b]. See also supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text
(discussing lender liability under environmental law and common law tort
principles).
136. Traditional land use regulations take a variety of forms ranging from zoning
ordinances, subdivision regulations, and the establishment of master plans.
Hershman, supra note 20, pt. 1 at 11 (providing historical overview of land
use controls and describing increasing complexity associated with land use as
well as impact on conveyancing practices).
137. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that following the 1960s, there has
been increased exercise of public authority over development through zoning
changes and exactions that has unstabilized development market, particularly
in area of large-scale projects requiring infrastructure investments); Fry, supra
note 12, at 483-84 (stating that the complex development process and questions
related to vesting of development rights serve to deter real estate development).
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development agreements. 138 Development agreements are essentially
bilateral contracts between a municipality and real estate developer}39
Unlike contract or conditional zoning,14O which may be judicially
suspect, development agreements are contracts made independent of
any type of rezoning. Their intent is not to change the applicable
zoning scheme, but rather is a promise by the municipality to freeze
the applicable land use regulatory scheme in return for specified
performances by the developer .1 41 Thus, a development agreement
implicitly conveys a vested right in development,142 going further than
1993]

138. See Fry, supra note 12, at 484; Kessler, supr.a note 27, at 452. See also Callies
& Grant, supra note 10, at 241 (finding that a 1986 survey of over 450
California cities and counties indicated that 150 were using development agreements, with 300 agreements in place and 150 being negotiated, and 100
additional commu~ities expressing interest in utilizing such agreements). For
an article comprehensively reviewing this 1986 survey see Cowart, supra note
11, at 9-29 (reviewing data and concluding that California has moved rapidly
to implement development agreements since enactment of enabling legislation
in 1979).
139. See Fry, supra note 12, at 484 (stating that development agreements are bilateral
contracts that are mutually enforceable and provide mutual advantages to both
developer and municipality); Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 239 (indicating
that development agreements act as a contract between local government and
private property holder based on bilateral covenants, thus providing greater_
certainty to developers). See also infra notes 142, 145, 179 and accompanying
text (discussing vested rights doctrine).
140. Contract zoning consists of a unilateral covenant, which places the sole burden
on the developer. Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 240. But see Wegner,
supra note 24, at 981 (concluding that, in fact, "contract zoning" involves no
exchange of consideration and thus is more regulatory than contractual in
nature).
141. Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 240. See Theodore C. Taub, Development
Agreements, A.L.L-A.B.A. LAND USE INsT. 555, 558 (1991) [hereinafter
Taub, Development Agreements) (indicating mutual benefits resulting to both
developer and local government from development agreements). The use of
bilateral promises, placing a burden and bestowing a benefit on both parties
of the agreement provides sufficient consideration to validate the agreement.
Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 240. Thus development agreements are
distinguishable from contract zoning, which is normally held invalid. [d. But
see Wegner, supra note 24, at 979 n.122 (indicating that courts generally hold
unilateral contracts valid, as opposed to bilateral contracts as invalid, but
concluding that a distinction is problematic and essentially a labeling game by
the court).
142. Donald L. Connors et aI., Developer Agreements: Affording Public Gain and
Private Certainty in the Modern Development Regulatory Process, A.L.LA.B.A. LAND USE INsT. 1801, 1806 (1989) (finding that one impetus behind
adoption of development agreement enabling statutes is diminution in property
values which occurs from changing land use regulations). For a good overview
on the effect of different stages of the development process on the vesting of
development rights, see John J. Delaney, Vested Rights and the Development
Chronology-1991 Update, A.L.L-A.B.A. LAND USE INST. 515 (1991). The
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subdivision regulations and conditional zoning by creating a property
right in the proposed development. 143 In return for the vested right,
the agreement provides the local government with an additional
source of revenue or needed infrastructure. l44 This section will examine the legal bases underlying development agreements and the
associated substantive and procedural requirements surrounding their
creation.

A.

Legal Authority for Development Agreements
Land use regulation and development are in a constant state of
change. 14s While they are separate processes, regulation as a public
development agreement acts as a vesting mechanism and assures the developer
that he may proceed with development under the existing statutory scheme at
the time development is commenced. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65864(b) (Deering
1991) (declaring legislative intent behind development agreements to act as
assurance of development rights); League of California Cities, Development
Agreements §§ 1.1, 1.6 (1980), reprinted in ALICE SUET YEE ET AL., DEVELOPMENT AOREEMENTS, 81, 86 (discussing legislative background behind California's ·enactment of development agreement enabling legislation as predicated
on need to insure vesting of development rights). See also supra notes 31-40
and accompanying text (illustrating problem posed by changing land use scheme
to developer who has incurred substantial start-up costs).
143. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkage, Vested Rights and Regulatory
Takings, HANDLING LAND USE & ENVTL. PROBS. OF REAL EST. 277, 318 (1990)
[hereinafter Taub, Exactions] (equating vested right in development with "propeny" right); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 29, at 376 (indicating that legislative
attempt to regulate vested right may constitute taking under Fifth Amendment).
As opposed to a development agreement, which is specifically designed to vest
the right in development, neither conditional zoning nor subdivision approval
are sufficient in and of themselves to constitute a vested right, and thus fail
to confer the same propeny interest on the. developer. See Laurie Reynolds,
Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of Discretion,
24 GA. L. REV. 525, 573 (1990) (indicating that while states apply different
standards in determination of vesting of rights in subdivision development,
general touchstone is "substantial financial expenditure" and right may not
even vest following final approval); Hanes & Minchew, supra note 29, at 392
(implying that as conditional zoning does not impose obligation on governmental unit, no vested right is created; but indicating that such zoning may
satisfy requirement for government action in application of equitable estoppel
analysis). See, e.g., Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Township, 398 N.W.2d
393 (Mich. 1986) (holding that approval of subdivision plan and subsequent
improvements failed to vest right in developer, where land was suitable for
new zoning purpose); Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 581 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ariz.
1978) (failing to find vested right in substandard lots based on recording of
plat); Board of County Supervisors v. United States, 23 CI. Ct. 205 (1991)
(indicating that conditional rezoning does not vest propeny right in development).
144. Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 239. See also Connors et aI., supra note
142, at 1805 (indicating that one motivating factor behind development agreement legislation was local government's desire to secure alternative funding
source for infrastructure requirements).
145. Delaney, supra note 142, at 515.
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function and development primarily a private function, they substantially impact on one another. Development must occur in compliance
with the applicable regulatory scheme, while the rate and type of
development may in turn define the regulatory scheme itself. To the
extent that the regulatory environment is in a constant state of flux,
the issue arises as to when a developer obtains a vested right in
development. Or to put the question in other words: At what stage
of real estate development may the developer complete a proposed
development despite changes in the applicable land use regulatory
scheme that now render the development nonconforming?
There are essentially two methods by which a developer may
obtain a vested right in a development project. Many jurisdictions
apply a bright line rule as to when sufficient development has
occurred to vest the right to continued development in the developer. l46 The minimum standard adopted in most states is issuance of
preliminary tract approval in the subdivision process. 147 Other states
set the threshold at the issuance of a building permit. 148 In any case,
it is likely that the developer will have incurred substantial expenditures and liabilities prior to a vesting of development rights. 149
Maryland is one state which has adopted a rather stringent
vested rights test. ISO In Maryland, in order to obtain a vested right
146. See Kessler, supra note 27, at 453-54 (implying that courts apply early or late
vesting approaches depending on whether jurisdiction is pro or anti developer);
Daniel J. Curtin, Legal Aspects of Development Agreements in General and
the California Experience in Particular, HANDLING LAND USE & ENVTL. PROBS.
OF REAL EST., 551, 557 (1991) (stating that most states apply bright line test
requiring issuance of building permit); Katherine E. Stone & Cristina L. Sierra,
Case Law on Public/Private Written Agreements, in MANAGING DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 7, at 99, 100 (indicating
that courts prefer bright line rule to subjective estoppel analysis). The bright
line rule adopted may allow for early or late vesting of the right to develop.
See generally Daniel Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land
Use Permits, 11 Sw. U. L. REv. 545 (1979) (providing general analysis of early
versus late vesting jurisdictions). Jurisdictions that follow an early vesting
approach, often apply a "last discretionary approval test." Curtin, supra note
146, at 558; cj. Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas County, 650 P.2d 963 (Or. Ct.
App. 1982) (vesting development right in planned unit development based on
discretionary approval in first stages of development).
147. James A. Kushner, Vested Development Rights, in 1992 ZONING & PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK § 7.03[1)[b), at 136 (Kenneth H. Young ed. 1992).
148. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 553
P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977) (holding that development right does not vest until building permit has been issued); Courthouse
Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto, 117 Cal. App. 3d 871, 884-87, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1074 (1981). See also Curtin, supra note 146, at 557-59 (discussing
harshness that results from application of bright line "building permit" vesting
rule, and potential uncertainty rendered to development process).
149. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
150. See Offen v. County Council for Prince George's County, 96 Md. App. 526,
573, 625 A.2d 424, 448 (1993).
.
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in development, a developer must meet a two prong test. 1SI The first
requirement is that· the developer have obtained a valid permit. 152
The second requirement, and the one which most often results in
litigation, is that the developer have commenced " 'a substantial
beginning in construction and in committing the land to the permitted
use before the change in the zoning ordinance ha[d] occurred.' "IS3
This test requires that the construction be visible to the public. ls4 If

151. See Prince George's County v. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 330 Md. 297,
623 A.2d 1296 (1993) (providing comprehensive overview of Maryland's law
on vested rights).
152. See id. at 307, 623 A.2d at 1301; O'Donnell v. Bassler, 289 Md. 501, 507, 425
A.2d 1003, 1007 (1981) ("Generally, in order to obtain a vested right in an
existing zoning use that will be protected against a subsequent change in a
zoning ordinance prohibiting that use, the owner must initially obtain a valid
permit."); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 A. 743 (1933); c/. County Council
for Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 707, 337 A.2d
712, 721 (1975).
153. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. Partnership, 330 Md. at 307, 623 A.2d at 1301 (quoting
O'Donnell, 289 Md. at 507, 425 A.2d at 1007). This prong of the vested rights
analysis requires actual construction, mere planning is not enough. See District
Land Corp., 274 Md. at 707, 337 A.2d at 721 (denying vested rights to
developer who had obtained building permit and incurred more than
$1,000,000.00 in studies and plans but had failed to commence actual construction prior to county's rezoning of property).
154. In Sunrise Development Ltd. Partnership, the developer had poured a footing
and installed fencing at the site of its proposed development, prior to a
rezoning which reclassified its property from multifamily high-density residential
to multifamily medium density residential-condominium. 330 Md. at 299-302,
623 A.2d at 1297-99. A stop work order was issued before the developer could
do any further work. This stop work order required the developer to obtain
additional permits in accord with the rezoning. Sunrise Dev. Ltd. Partnership,
330 Md. at 302, 623 A.2d at 1299. The developer appealed the stop work
order to Prince George's County Planning Board. The Board refused to vacate
the order, and found that the footing did not constitute a "manifest commencement of ... work ... which everyone can readily see and recognize as
the commencement of a building" in accord with Maryland vested rights law.
Id. at 305, 623 A.2d at 1300.
The developer appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the
Board, holding that the footing sufficed to meet the commencement of the
construction prong of vested rights analysis, because member of the public
could discover it upon proper inspection. Id. This holding was affirmed by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which concluded that " 'the footing
column was recognizable as the commencement of construction, upon inspection.' " Id. at 306, 623 A.2d at 1301.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed both courts and affirmed the
Board's holding. It first reviewed Maryland's law on vested rights. The court
then focused on whether Maryland law only required that the commencement
of construction be recognizable to the "reasonably diligent building inspector"
or the public at large. Id. at 308-11, 623 A.2d at 1302-03. The court of appeals
concluded that Maryland law required that the public be able to see the

a
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a developer fails to meet this stringent test he has no vested right
and, as such, must comply with any subsequent rezoning or permit
requirements.
If a developer has not reached the stage of development required
for the vesting of development rights, such a right may arise from
the application of equitable estoppel. The line between a vested right
founded in equitable estoppel analysis, as opposed to one that accrues
under a jurisdiction's vested rights rules, is not always clear. ISS In
applying an equitable estoppel analysis to determine whether a vested
right has inured, the court will inquire into whether it would be
unjust, given the developer's up front investment in reliance on
specific government actions, to force the developer to modify or
abandon his existing development plan. Such a finding estopps the
local government from enforcing a subsequently enacted zoning ordinance, thereby implicitly vesting in the developer a property right
in continued development. ls6
The primary criticism of the application of equitable estoppel in
the determination of whether the developer's right to develop has
vested, is that it is often subjective and arbitrary.1S7 Under an

construction. The court stated:
In order for rights to be vested before a change in the law, the work
done must be recognizable, on inspection of the property by a reasonable member of the public, as the commencement of construction
of a building for a use permitted under the then current zoning.
Id. at 313, 623 A.2d at 1304.
155. Fry, supra note 12, at 485 (indicating that while doctrines of vested rights and
equitable estoppel have different theoretical bases, courts have essentially
merged the doctrines into one in determining whether a development right has
vested); c/. Daniel J. Curtin & Michael H. Zischke, Development Agreements:
Securing Vested Rights and Project Completion Benefits, in 1989 ZONING &
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 15.02 (Mark S. Dennison ed.), reprinted in Curtin,
supra note 146, app. D at 609 (stating that equitable estoppel forms the basis
of vested rights doctrine). But cj. Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at 100 (citing
to Cunningham & Kramer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development
Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 629 (1978) and positing that while estoppel
forms basis of vested rights doctrine, courts seldom actually apply estoppel
analysis, preferring to opt for bright line rule determining when property rights
vest).
156. See Hanes & Minchew, supra note 29, at 382-84 (indicating that while estoppel
theoretically differs from doctrine of vested rights, the end result is same, and
furthermore, that both doctrines consist of essentially identical elements); see
also supra notes 150-55 and infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing application of equitable estoppel and attendant concerns).
157. Fry, supra note 12, at 492; see Taub, Exactions, supra note 143, at 318
(stressing subjective nature of determining good faith reliance); Delaney, supra
note 142, at 517 (concluding that courts application of equitable estoppel in
area of vested rights has resulted in "a hodge-podge of ad-hoc, case-by-case
decision making by the judiciary").
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equitable estoppel analysis the judiciary must decide the question of
what degree of development or type of government action creates a
vested right. lss The application of a variety of different standards
has resulted. ls9
In Maryland, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not help a
developer that has relied to its detriment on the issuance of a permit
that a local government subsequently asserts was unlawfully issued. l60
Maryland courts have also adopted "zoning estoppel, "161 which may
provide some protection to a real estate developer. In Maryland, it
appears that a real estate developer may invoke zoning estoppel to
protect his development rights in cases involving particularly egregious
acts by public officials specifically taken to prevent vesting. 162
In addition to equitable estoppel or zoning estoppel, the case of
Mayor of Baltimore v. Cran&63 may provide some protection to a
real estate developer in Maryland. In Crane, the Maryland Court of
Appeals applied a kind of hybrid equitable estoppel/vested rights

158. See Hanes & Minchew, supra note 29, at 379 (indicating that ability of
landowner to vest right of development is contingent on statutory interpretation
and case law, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
159. See Delaney, supra note 142, at 517-18 (delineating three tests often applied in
estoppel analysis as: (I) the proportionate/ratio test; (2) balancing test; and
(3) physical alteration of land test).
160. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 93
Md. App. 59, 79, 611 A.2d 993, 1003 (1992) ("[A] municipality is not estopped
to set up the illegality of a permit. And the issuance of an illegal permit creates
no 'vested rights' in the permittee. We have held . .. that the permits issued
to the appellee were in violation of the zoning ordinance; consequently they
were unlawful and did not estop the appellant from prosecuting this suit.")
(quoting Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md. 271, 280, 179 A.2d 712, 716
(1962) (emphasis in original».
161. Zoning estoppel differs from equitable estoppel in focus. Specifically, zoning
estoppel is designed to "prevent [land use officials] from taking particularly
egregious actions designed to prevent vesting and then relying on the absence
of vesting to thwart the previously permitted plans of the developer." Offen
v. County Council for Prince George's County, 96 Md. App. 526, 569 n.23,
625 A.2d 424, 446 n.23 (1993); see also Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln,
451 N.W.2d 702, 704-07 (Neb. 1990); Faymor Dev. Co. v. Board of Standards
and Appeals, 383 N.E.2d 100, 102-03 (N.Y. 1978).
162. Offen, 96 Md. App. at 567-78, 625 A.2d at 445-50, appears to be Maryland's
latest work on the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the real estate development
context. In Offen, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland expressly adopted
the doctrine of zoning estoppel. It stated: "[E]specially egregious actions of
public officials in stalling the issuance of permits in order to eliminate development by downzoning may create a ·zoning estoppel as to particular properties." [d. at 577, 625 A.2d at 450.
163. 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976).
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analysis on behalf 0 f a real estate developer. 164 Specifically, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that the developer had acquired a vested
contractual right in his proposed development and estopped the City
from applying subsequent zoning enactments against the developer .IM
The City, following negotiations with the owners of a parcel of real
estate, passed an ordinance which provided that where a landowner
transfers a portion of his property to the City for highway purposes,
he would still maintain the right to develop any retained land to the
"same density . . . as would have been permissible prior to the
conveyance."I66 In estopping the City from enforcing a subsequently
passed ordinance which would have limited the developer's right to
develop pursuant to the initial ordinance, the court held that while
the initial ordinance did not create any vested right in the traditional
sense, it had created a vested contractual interest. This interest
guaranteed the developer's right to develop according to his initial
plan and density. 167
While Crane rests the right of the developer in contract, other
cases apply equitable estoppel more generally and simply estop the
municipality from enforcing a particular ordinance in the case of a
specific development. l68 Regardless of the language used, the result
is the same: The developer is exempted from the application of the
ordinance and may continue development under the pre-existing
scheme. Crane may be reconciled with more general estoppel or
vested rights analysis in one of two ways. First, one may essentially
ignore the language of the court and equate the right created to a
property right similar to a transfer development right. 169 In the
alternative, even if the right is contractual in nature, it is enforceable
1993]

164. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text (examining Crane and reconciling
its analysis with estoppel and vested rights analysis).
165. Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976). In Crane,
the city enacted an ordinance granting increases in density allowances to a
developer in exchange for a dedication of property to the city. The developer
complied with the terms of the ordinance by donating property, however a
subsequent rezoning by the city overrode the developer's right to the added
d.ensity. [d. at 202-05, 352 A.2d at 788-89. The court held that the developer's
dedication of property created a vested contractual interest, as opposed to a
purely vested interested or contract right, and this acted to estop the city from
enforcing the subsequent legislation. [d. at 206, 352 A.2d at 790. For a general
discussion of this case within the context of development agreements as
contractual or regulatory in nature, see Wegner, supra note 24, at 1002-03.
166. Crane, 277 Md. at 202-03, 352 A.2d at 788.
167. [d. at 206, 352 A.2d at 790.
168. See, e.g., The Florida Cos. v. Orange County, 411 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 510 P.2d 1281 (Kan. 1973); Clackamus
County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Or. 1970).
169. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1002-03.
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under the Contract Clause of the Constitution .170 Similarly the distinction between the right created under equitable estoppel or vested
rights doctrine is one of analysis and theory, as opposed to result. 171
One caveat, however, is that the right founded in equitable estoppel
analysis is a personal right. That is, it is specific to the developer
and does not attach to the developer's estate.172 Thus, a right based
on equitable estoppel is probably not transferable or assignable with
the property, while a vested right constitutes a property interest and,
therefore, is assignable. 173
Some state legislatures have attempted to narrow the inquiry
into when rights vest by statutory enactments that define the occurrences vesting development rights}74 Moreover, beginning with California in 1979, several states, including Hawaii, Nevada, Florida,
Arizona, and, most recently, Louisiana, responded to their judiciaries' adoption of vesting rules that adversely impact real estate
development through the enactment of enabling legislation which
authorizes local governments to enter into development agreements
with real estate developers. m This enabling legislation endows local
governments with greater flexibility 176 in granting early vesting rights
170. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See infra notes 172, 179 and accompanying
text (evaluating application of Contract Clause to development agreements);
c/. Inlet Assoc. v. Assateague Condominium Ass'n, 313 Md. 413, 438, 545
A.2d 1296, 1308 (1988) ("[A] municipality may make an offer by ordinance
which, if accepted and acted upon by another in compliance with its terms,
may give rise to a contract, the obligation of which is constitutionally protected
against impairment.") (citing Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786).
171. See supra notes 150, 152, 153 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., City of Parkland v. Septimus, 428 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Jones v. First Va. Mortgage, 399 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(per curiam).
173. See infra notes 241-68, 279, 280 and accompanying text (arguing that right
vested under development agreement is equivalent of real covenant that runs
with the land or developer's estate and thus is assignable).
174. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66948.1(a) (Deering 1991) (establishing provisions
for filing of tentative map vesting rights for limited period based on development approvals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(4) (1991) (granting grace
period from zoning and land use restriction changes for statutory term following
platting of subdivision property); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 to -106 (1991)
(conferring vested property right upon approval of site specific development
plan, inclusive of development agreements).
175. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (1991) (enacted in 1988); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 65864-65869.5 (Deering 1991) (enacted in 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220
to .3243 (West 1991) (enacted in 1986); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 46-121 to -132
(1991) (enacted in 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:4780.21 to .33 (West
1991) (enacted in 1988); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.0201 to .0207 (Michie
1991) (enacted in 1985); c/. COL. REv. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 to -106 (1991)
(establishing vested property right in development, following approval of development agreement).
176. See Taub, Development Agreements, supra note 141, at 558-59 (examining
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to developers in exchange for specified consideration by the developer.177 The legislation establishes a regulatory scheme that encompasses both procedural and substantive guidelines and requirements
governing the terms and form of development agreements. 178 Before
discussing these guidelines and requirements, the next section examines the constitutional implications of development agreements.

B.

Constitutional Implications l79

1.

The Contract Clause

Development agreements constitute contracts between a municipality and a real estate developer and thus implicate the Contract
Clause of the Constitution. 180 By freezing land use regulations, development agreements act as a limitation on the power of future
legislatures, thus raising the specter of a violation of the reserved
powers doctrine. 181 This doctrine establishes the principle that a
government may not bargain or contract away its police power and
limits the enforceability of contracts under the Contract Clause. 182

177.
178.

179.
180.

181.

182.

benefits resulting from development agreements to both developer and local
government, and concluding that development agreement allows tailoring of
development to specific needs of community); League of California Cities,
supra note 142, § 1.1, reprinted at 81 (stressing flexibility provided by statute
in order to meet specific local community needs).
See supra notes 12, 139, 141, 143 and accompanying text (discussing bilateral
nature of development agreements, inclusive of mutuality of enforcement and
relevant consideration).
See generally Wegner, supra note 24, at 995-1003 (discussing substantive and
procedural requirements of differing states' development agreement enabling
legislation); Connors et aI., supra note 142, at 1806-25 (summarizing different
components and requirements of varying development agreement statutes); see
also infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text (providing overview of statutory
requirements).
For comprehensive overviews of the constitutional questions implicated by
development agreements, see generally Wegner, supra note 24; Kessler, supra
note 27, at 464-72; Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at 102-17.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Contract Clause bars government from
impairing contracts. For a general discussion of the Contract Clause and its
meaning, see Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping From
the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1990).
See Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 241-43 (examining development agreements as potential violation of reserved powers doctrine and concluding that
courts primarily apply principle to invalidate government actions that bind
future legislature infinitely); Kessler, supra note 27, at 464-69 (examining
applicable framework for determining when a contract implicates the police
power and is thus invalidated).
See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), reh'g denied,
431 U.S. 975 (1977) (reviewing history of reserved powers and implications for

154

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 23

Development agreements directly implicate this inherent tension between the Contract Clause of the Constitution and the reserved
powers doctrine. 183 To date, no court has specifically addressed the
constitutionality of development agreements within this context. 184
While facially such agreements appear to violate the reserved powers
doctrine in that they implicate land use regulation, which is clearly
within the police power, ISS several arguments support the constitutionality of development agreements. 186 Moreover, local governments

183.

184.

185.

186.

power of present government to bind future government actions through
contract, and establishing analytical framework for determining when contract
illegally bargains away police power as question of whether power is an
"essential attribute of sovereignty"). [d. at 23. The general rule. is that a
legislature may not enter into a contract which binds future legislatures because
this is a bargaining away of the police power. See id.; see also Wegner, supra
note 24, at 962-77 (providing comprehensive overview of reserved power
doctrine).
See Wegner, supra note 24, at 971-75 (discussing interaction of Contract Clause
and reserved power doctrine in public-private contracting); Kessler, supra note
27, at 464-69 (analyzing interaction of Contract Clause and reserved powers
doctrine in validity of development agreements); Fry, supra note 12, at 497
(considering conflict and tension existing between Contract Clause and police
power).
See Curtin, supra note 146, at 559 (discussing construction of development
agreement as obligation of contract or violation of reserved powers doctrine
and indicating that while no appellate court has yet addressed constitutionality
of agreements, statute is presumptively valid until judicial decision to contrary);
ct. Urban West Communities v. City of Moorpark, No. 100258, (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1988), reprinted in Connors et aI., supra note 142, at 1851 (holding
development agreement enforceable against municipality under principle of
estoppel and concluding that there was no invalid contracting away of police
power).
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning as valid
exercise of police power); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825
(1987); see also Fry, supra note 12, at 498 (citing A vco decision for the
proposition that agreement contracting away government's police power that
extends to land use regulation in the future, would be void as contrary to
public policy).
One potential argument that supports the constitutionality of development
agreements, is that they are in fact an exercise of the police power. Connors,
supra note 142, at 1855 (stating that government exercised police power in
approving development agreement). Furthermore, arguably the Contract Clause
itself may act as a limiting factor on the police power. See United States Trust
Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n.14; see also supra note 174 and accompanying text,
(discussing United States Trust Co. decision and contract impairment analysis);
ct. Lincoln Property Co. v. Torrance, No. C607339, slip. op. (Super. Ct.
County of Los Angeles, Cal., November 4, 1986) (implying in dicta that
development agreement vests property right under terms delineated by agreement, while upholding local government actions as not inconsistent with terms
of agreement); Callies & Grant, supra note 10, at 242 (implying that invalidation
of government action under reserved powers doctrine may be limited to cases
where contracting is for indefinite time, and noting trend towards upholding
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presently continue to use development agreements, regardless of their
potentially questionable constitutionality. 187
2.

The Due Process Clause

Development agreements may also be attacked on due process
grounds. 188 The extent to which such agreements implicate due process
concerns depends on their characterization as legislative, quasi-judicial, or administrative in nature.l 89 This characterization will directly
impact on the degree of judicial scrutiny applied in examining development agreements, as well as the remedies available. l90 California,
in its enabling legislation, specifically labels development agreements
as legislative in nature. 191 Louisiana, which has most recently enacted
enabling legislation, has followed this characterization, as have a
number of other states. 192 As a legislative act, the development

187.

188.
189.

190.

191.
192.

government contracts when reasonable); Fry, supra note 12, at 500-02 (analogizing case law in similar areas to development agreements, such as annexation
agreements and contract or conditional zoning, and concluding that trend may
be away from implying limitless police power and towards upholding government contracts). See generally Wegner, supra note 24, at 1008-23 (analyzing
and providing framework for constitutional analyses of development agreements
as violation of reserved powers doctrine and corresponding implications of
Contract Clause).
Lindell L. Marsh, The Future oj Development Agreements, DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra note 11, at 153 [hereinafter Marsh, Future] ("No question:
Development .agreements are here to stay."); see Callies & Grant, supra note
10, at 243 (concluding that, in light of existing case law, it is unlikely that
development agreement statutes will be struck down as unconstitutional).
Wegner, supra note 24, at 1008.
A legislative act is one establishing public policy; an administrative act is one
executing public policy; and an adjudicatory act is one involving the application
of general standards to a specific factual context. Stone & Sierra, supra note
146, at 111-12; Wegner, supra note 24, at 1011-13.
Legislative acts are generally subject to challenge by referendum or initiative.
Courts will apply greater deference in considering legislative validity, and due
process concerns are not implicated. Furthermore, its construction is a legal
question and the parties' intent may be irrelevant. Stone & Sierra,. supra note
146, at Ill. Administrative acts fall within the rules applicable to contracts
and therefore are subject to greater constitutional scrutiny in light of the
Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. [d. at 112; see also supra
notes 172, 179 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Contract
Clause for development agreements). Adjudicative acts implicate due process
concerns under the Constitution, including the necessity of hearing and notice.
Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at 112.
\
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65867.5 (Deering 1991).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.29 (West 1991) ("A development agreement
shall be approved by ordinance of the governing authority of the parish or
municipality."); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3223 (West 1991) (requiring
that local government establish ordinances regulating procedures and requirements governing development agreements, and identifying such agreements as
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agreement assumes a presumption of constitutional validity, as well
as immunization from many of the procedural due process requirements that are imposed on quasi-judicial acts.193 Conceptually, development agreements, however, do not appear to conform to notions
of what constitutes a legislative act. 194 Furthermore, courts are not
bound by a legislative label but rather they will undertake their own
inquiry into the actual nature of the particular act. 19S Because courts
have yet to determine the exact characterization of the development
agreement, it is advisable to structure such agreements in a manner
that addresses the due process concerns arising if the agreement is
determined to be quasi-judicial in nature,l96 as well as comply with
all of the proper requisites for contractual formation, inclusive of
adequate consideration. 197
3.

The Takings Clause
The final constitutional challenge to development agreements
rests in the Takings Clause. 198 The Takings Clause poses the question
of whether the exaction, imposed on the developer by the development agreement, violates the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
government takings without just compensation. l99 The Supreme Court
has yet to offer a definitive test for deciding when a government
regulation constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 2OO In

193.

194.

195.
196.
197.

198.
199.

200.

legislative in nature); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.0203 (Michie 1991) (requiring
that development agreement be approved by ordinance). But cj. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 46-131 (1991) (classifying development agreement as administrative act
by governmental unit party to agreement).
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Sanford M. Skaggs, Legal Issues and Considerations,
in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 11, at 121, 129; see also supra note
181 and accompanying text (distinguishing legislative, administrative and quasijudicial acts).
Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at 111; Curtin & Skaggs, supra note 193, at
130. Because a development agreement addresses a specific factual setting it
appears to be more adjudicative in nature. Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at
Ill. The fact that the development agreement directly implicates zoning,
however, leans towards its classification as a legislative act. Id.
Curtin & Skaggs, supra note 193, at 130 (stating that label is subject to judicial
override based on common law doctrine and constitutional law).
Stone & Sierra, supra note 146, at 112 (stating that to ensure validity as quasijudicial act, development agreement should provide for notice and be based
on substantial evidentiary record, thus complying with due process concerns).
Id. (stating that contractual nature may reflect implementation of policy
rendering agreement administrative act, subject to contractual requirements and
protection under Contract Clause of United States Constitution).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. (providing in relevant part, "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation").
Id. See generally Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements A/ter Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 22 URB. LAW. 23 (1990) (discussing impact of
Nollan holding on constitutionality of development agreement exactions).
BRIAN W. BLAESSER, ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 68-69 (Brian
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission/OJ the Court applied a two
prong test to decide whether an exaction constituted a taking. First,
the Court required that the regulation or exaction "substantially
advance" a "legitimate state interest," in order to avoid classification
as a taking. 202 The second requirement was that the regulation/
exaction not deny an owner economically viable use of its property.20J
In analyzing the substantial advancement prong of the test, the Court
formulated a rational nexus requirement. 204 This rational nexus test
is met where the exaction imposed seeks to mitigate the condition
that underlies the regulation. 20s
More recently, in Dolan v. City oj Tigard,206 the Supreme Court
clarified its opinion in Nollan. Specifically, it reaffirmed its commitment to Nollan's requirement that an "'essential nexus' exist[] between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted
by the [governmental unit)."207 The Court then went on to explore
the "required degree of connection between the exactions and the
projected impact of the proposed development. "208 In Dolan, the
Supreme Court held that in order for an exaction to survive a takings
challenge, the local government unit seeking to impose the exaction

201.
202.

203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.

W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds. 1989) (discussing failure of Supreme
Court to identify specific test for what constitutes a regulatory taking and
stating that the Court generally applies ad hoc balancing test). A number of
different judicial standards have been applied in determining what constitutes
a taking. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987) (upholding coal subsidence regulations as furthering legitimate state
interest, while not denying owner an economically viable use of property);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (applying two pronged endsmeans, rational nexus test in upholding zoning ordinance that restricted development of residential property); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding landmark restriction and applying test of
reciprocity of advantage).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980».
Id. (citing Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
In Nol/an, the Court stated that "unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not
a valid regulation of land use but an 'out and out plan of extortion.'" 483
U.S. at 837 (citations omitted); see also Crew, supra, note 199, at 35-37
(discussing Court's formulation of standard governing required link between
exaction and permitted use, and concluding that it most closely resembles the
rational nexus test, despite Court's declining to specifically adopt standard).
Thus, the exaction imposed must be linked to the condition that would permit
a regulation of the land use.
Nol/an, 483 U.S. at 834; see also Crew, supra note 199, at 51-52 (proposing
that tying of exaction to impact of proposed development meets Nol/an test
and provides for reciprocity of advantage).
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
Id. at 2317 (citing Nol/an, 483 U-i'S. at 837).
Id.
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must "make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development. "209 It labelled this inquiry one of
"'rough proportionality.'''210
Under Nollan and Dolan, it appears that so long as a municipality concludes that a proposed exaction will in most likelihood
eradicate an adverse impact on the community resulting from the
proposed development, that exaction will survive a takings challenge. 211 Thus, a municipality that could validly limit density in a
particular zone because of concerns related to traffic, could impose
an exaction requiring a developer to construct roads for the proposed
development, or contribute to a transportation fund, so long as there
is a finding by the municipality that these exactions would offset
some of the increased traffic resulting from the development. 212
Similarly, to the extent the exaction imposed by the development
agreement is linked to a consequence of the proposed development
it will in all likelihood survive a takings attack under the principle
of Nollan and Dolan.
The bilateral nature of the development agreement may also
undermine a constitutional takings challenge. In Leroy Land Development v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,213 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals examined a constitutional takings challenge to an
exaction requirement imposed by a settlement agreement between a
developer and a government agency. The court stated that "a takings
analysis as articulated in Nollan is inapplicable where, as here, the
parties choose to terminate or avoid litigation by executing a settlement agreement supported by consideration."214 Similarly, a devel209. [d. at 2319-20.
210. [d. at 2319.
211. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22. While Dolan requires that a municipality
make a finding supporting the relationship between the proposed exaction and
the impact of the development, it fails to establish a clear rule as to the sort
of findings required to survive a takings challenge. The Court states: "No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some
effort to quantify its findings in support of the [proposed exaction] ... beyond
the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the [adverse impact of
the development.]" [d. at 2322 (emphasis added). Under Dolan, "could" is
clearly insufficient, but "will" or "is likely to" appear to be enough. [d.
(quoting Justice Peterson's dissent in the underlying case, Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), that a
finding that the adverse impact could be offset "is a far cry from a finding
that ... [it] will, or is likely, to" be offset.).
212. See, e.g., Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City & County of San Fransico, 750 P.2d
324 (Cal. 1988) (upholding city mass transit assessment in downtown development context).
213. 939 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991).
214. Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 939 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1991).
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opment agreement is bilateral in nature and supported by
consideration. m The court in Leroy continued, holding that even if
Nollan analysis was applicable, there was a substantial relationship
between the exaction and the regulations, making it clear that an
exaction will survive the rational nexus test where it is related to the
proposed development itself. 216

c. Statutory Requirements
The enabling statutes define the development agreement's process
and substance. In addition, these statutes provide a legislative background, rendering the agreements less constitutionally suspect as
either an overstepping of the police power or an infringement on the
.reserved powers doctrine. They also delineate the required nexus
between the imposed exaction and the proposed development, in
order to avoid the implication of a takings problem.
Statutory enabling acts establish mandatory procedural requirements. These requirements include provisions mandating public notice, the holding of public hearings regarding a proposed development
agreement,217 and the establishment of periodic monitoring provisions
designed to ensure timely compliance with the terms of the agreement. 218 Furthermore, it is common practice that a development
agreement only becomes effective upon the adoption of an ordinance
specifically memorializing its terms.219
215. See supra notes 12, 139, 141, 143 and accompanying text.
216. Leroy Land Dev., 939 F.2d at 699.
217. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65867 (Deering 1991) ("Public hearing on
application for development agreement; Notice."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3225
(West 1991) ("Public hearings."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-128 (1991) ("Public
hearing."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4780-28 (West 1991) ("Public hearing;
Notice of intention to consider adoption. ").
218. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.1 (requiring annual review, indicating
demonstrable good faith compliance on part of developer); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3235 (imposing annual periodic review for good faith compliance, similar
to that under California law); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-125 (providing for notice
of material breach following periodic review, as well as opportunity to cure
defect); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.0205 (requiring governmental review biannually, providing for agreement cancellation upon developer default). Other
procedural requirements imposed under statutory enabling acts are a requirement of recordation of the agreement, acting as notice to public of terms of
agreement. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65868.5; see also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865
(requiring that every local government unit wishing to utilize development
agreements enact ordinance establishing procedures and requirements governing
consideration of development agreements).
219. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 ("A development agreement is a legislative
act which will be approved by ordinance .... "). Under the California statutory
scheme, which labels development agreements as legislative actions, development'
agreements are subject to referendum. Id.
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In addition to establishing procedural guidelines, the statutes
delineate mandatory substantive requirements. The California statute
is typical in requiring that the development agreement specify "the
duration of the agreement, the permitted uses of the property, the
density and intensity of use, the maximum height and size of proposed
buildings, and provisions for reservation or dedication of land for.
public purposes. "220 In addition, the statutory scheme may indicate
other matters to be addressed or specified by the agreement. 221
The statutes provide that the local government unit may enter
into a development agreement with any person having a legal or
equitable interest in real property. 222 This may be understood to mean
that the appropriate parties negotiating the agreement are the developer and the local government unit. Wherever possible, however, the
parties to the agreement's negotiation should include not only the
relevant local government unit and developer, but also the entity that
will provide the financing for the development. 223 This is in accord
with the proposition of this Article that development agreements
enhance the creditworthiness of a particular development project. A
development agreement accomplishes this enhancement by injecting
a degree of certainty into the real estate development process. 224 To

220. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.2; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.24
(requiring that agreement include duration of the agreement, permitted uses of
property, density or intensity of use, maximum height and size of proposed
buildings, and provisions for reservation or dedication of land for public
purposes); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-126 (requiring description of property;
specification of permitted uses, density, height and size; provisions for dedication of land; and termination date).
221. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-126(c) (stating that development agreement
may include commencement dates, as well as "any other matter not inconsistent
with this chapter, nor prohibited by law"); FLA. REV. STAT. § 163.3227
(providing that development agreement may specify commencement or completion dates for any phase of multi-phase development); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33:4780.24 (stating that agreement may include "conditions, terms, restrictions, and requirements for subsequent discretionary actions;" timing requirements or "terms and conditions relating to financing of necessary public
facilities").
222. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.0201; HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-123; LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4780.22; cj. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 9-500.05.A ("A municipality ...
may enter into development agreements relating to property in municipality .... ").
223. This is so because the structure and terms of the agreement may impact its
viability as a financeable vehicle in the real estate finance market. Cj. supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing need for lender involvement
in negotiation of lease that is to be object of leasehold financing).
224. See supra notes 138-42, 144 and accompanying text (discussing development
agreements as tool for vesting development right).
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the extent that the lender is included in the initial negotiations of
the agreement it is easier to design the agreement in a manner
consistent with the lender's concerns. 22S
In delineating the applicable duties and obligations of the parties,
the statutes provide that the land use regulations applicable to the
development will be those in effect at the time the developer and the
municipality execute the agreement. 226 This freezes the applicable land
use scheme with respect to development, and vests the right to develop
according to the developer's plan. Finally, some statutes require that
the development agreement comply with the comprehensive plan. 227

D.

Noncompliance and Effect
Remedies for noncompliance with a development agreement may
be set forth in both the enabling legislation and the agreement itself.
To enforce and oversee compliance by the developer, state enabling
legislation requires that the municipality conduct a periodic review
of the developer. 228 If this review indicates that the developer has
breached or is failing to comply with the terms of the agreement,
the statute provides for unilateral amendment or termination of the
agreement by the municipality. 229 California, Hawaii, Florida, and
Louisiana take the issue of enforcement one step further by statutorily
providing for the remedy of specific performance. 23o In addition to
the statutory remedies for noncompliance, the agreement may further
identify those events or conditions that represent material breaches
or noncompliance and specify corresponding rights and remedies.
Judicial construction of the agreement as a covenant running with
the land, or real covenant,231 would provide a further source of
225. See infra notes 228, 268, 279, 280, 308 and accompanying text (outlining
226.

227.

228.
229.

230.
231.

potential concerns of lender in development agreements, used to secure financing).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65868; FLA. REV. STAT. § 163.3233; HAW. REV. STAT.'
§ 46-127; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.27. These same provisions provide
that subsequently enacted land use regulations are applicable to the development, but only to the extent that they do not conflict with the development
delineated by the agreement.
FLA. REv. STAT. § 163.3231; HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-129.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (providing statutory examples of
procedural requirement of periodic review).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865.1; FLA. REv. STAT. § 163.3235; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33:4780.23; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2780.0205; cf HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 46-125 (requiring notice of noncompliance with opportunity to cure defect,
prior to termination of agreement).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.4; FLA. REV. STAT. § 163.3243; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 46-127; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.26.
See infra notes 259-77 and accompanying text (proposing that development
agreement be construed as real covenant and analyzing in terms of common
law requirements of running covenants).
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remedial protection because such a construction would allow for the
associated common law rights and remedies. 232 Finally, it is possible
that a municipality might require security through either the posting
of a performance bond or letter of credit. 233
Governmental noncompliance under the agreement is slightly
more complicated. The issue of governmental noncompliance is directly related to the constitutional questions raised by such agreements. 234 Three separate analyses must be undertaken: constitutional
takings,235 impairment of contract,236 and common law contract. 237 A
change in government regulation that is applied to a post-agreement
development deprives the developer of its vested right under the
agreement. To the extent that the vested right constitutes a property
right, the government breach will be subject to constitutional takings
analysis. In the case of a negotiated development agreement, supported by valid consideration, the municipality's breach, or attempt
to enforce a subsequently enacted regulation to the detriment of the
proposed development, interferes with the developer's investment
backed expectations. 238 A court will examine the nature of the government action, as well as the post hoc regulations' impact.239 Because
232. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.21 (1984)
(listing remedies associated with breach of covenant as being injunction against
future breach and entitlement of damages).
233. See River Vale Planning Bd. v. E & R Office Interiors, 575 A.2d 55, 56-57
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (examining developer's attempt to recoup
performance bond following decision to withdraw from development agreement).
234. See supra notes 171-202 and accompanying text (exploring constitutional issues
implicated by development agreements).
235. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1030-35 (analyzing governmental non-compliance
with terms of agreement vis a vis Takings Clause); se(!c:;also supra notes 190202 (laying out constitutional takings analysis applicable to development agreements).
236. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1036-38 -(identifying impairment of contract
doctrine as major concern for breaching governmental agency and stating that
critical question will be whether or not government can justify actions); see
also supra notes 172-79 (discussing impairment of contract doctrine and application to development agreements).
237. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1035-36 (stating that as general rule, parties
may seek common law contract remedies including, restitution, consequential
damages, and specific performance); see also supra note 189 (discussing need
for development agreement to comply with requisite contract formation requirements, in order to be binding as administrative act).
238. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1030-35 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) ("[W]hen government representations concerning the
conditions associated with the issuance of a development permits [lead] a
developer to make substantial investment in the project in question, distinct
investment-based expectations [are] created, and [can] not be infringed by
subsequent changes in government policy."».
239. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text (outlining constitutional takings
analysis).
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the impact of the post hoc application of the regulation may effectively deprive the developer of the ability to complete development,
a court will find a taking unless the regulation is supported by a
substantial public health or safety concern.24O The remedy will be an
injunction against government enforcement of the regulation. 241
Under impairment of contract analysis a court is similarly likely
to enforce the agreement. 242 Enforcement, however, is subject to
limitation where the noncompliance is related to the municipality's
exercise of its police power.243 Finally, if the agreement is upheld as
a valid contract and the municipality breaches the agreement, the
court may apply straight forward contract law and give any corresponding remedy. 244
V. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT AS A FINANCEABLE
INSTRUMENT
A construction lender's key concern in extending real estate
financing is the developer's ability to repay the loan. Completion of
the proposed development is essential to the loan's repayment. 24S
Failure to complete the proposed construction in a timely fashion
and within budget materially impairs the value of the collateral
property in addition to diminishing or eliminating the availability of
takeout financing. 246 Thus, in evaluating a proposed real estate development project, the lender will be alert to any potential threats
to timely completion. A change in the applicable land use restriction
scheme represents one such potential threat. Such a change may
impose substantial additional costs and delays on the development
process and, in an extreme case, may render completion too costly

240. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1032-33.
241. See id. at 1033. Damages may also be available. See First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
242. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing inherent tension
between Contracts Clause and reserved powers doctrine).
243. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text (providing overview of takings
questions raised by development agreement, including validation of action as
within police power and thus not a taking).
244. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 1035 (positing that developer may seek damages
and specific performance in breach of contract action).
245. See supra notes 6<J.;87 and accompanying text (discussing lender concerns in
land development and construction phases as centering around completion of .
development because of strong relationship between completion of project and
material value of collateral property).
246. See supra notes 5, 15, 54, 58, 81, 82, 86, 135 and accompanying text (discussing
use of takeout financing commitment as insurance to construction lender of
future repayment, but indicating that substantial delay in completion may
cancel commitment, thus rendering repayment less certain).
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or unfeasible. This risk exists until the developer obtains a vested
right in the development of the proposed project. 248
This section proposes that development agreements create and
convey a property interest to the developer that increases the value
of the real estate used as collateral in securing construction financing.
By according the developer the right to develop, the agreement not
only contributes greater predictability and certainty in the development process, but actually provides an additional component to the
property mortgaged. This section first defines the development agreement as a real property interest. Second, it discusses the structure
and terms of the agreement that are essential in rendering it a viable
financeable device. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the
assignability and enforceability of the agreement.
247

A.

Development Agreement as a Real Property Interest

Development agreements, by freezing the applicable land use
regulatory scheme, vest the right of development in the developer. 249
In fact, state legislatures enacted development agreement statutes to
address the problems associated with the late vesting of development
rights as well as to provide greater flexibility to municipalities in the
land use planning process. 250 A vested right in development represents
one of the key sticks in the bundle that constitutes real property. 251
By expressly identifying this interest and separately granting it to the
247. See Crew, supra note 199, at 29 (acknowledging that lack of vested right and
corresponding uncertainty in development process causes lenders concern and
results in higher interest rates on land use development loans); see also supra
notes 31-40 and accompanying text (illustrating problems that changing land
use scheme imposes on real estate development process).
248. A vested right serves to freeze the land use regulatory scheme as applied to
that particular development. It freezes the land use scheme, however, only to
the extent necessary to preserve the developer's right to develop as originally
agreed. Any subsequently enacted regulations that do not directly conflict with
the delineated frozen land use scheme are still valid. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65866
(West 1983).
249. See supra notes 138-42, 144 and accompanying text (discussing use of development agreements to vest development rights).
250. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 3-4. The California enabling legislation specifically
declares that the motivation behind the legislation is the need to provide
[a]ssurance to the applicant for a development project that upon
approval of the project, the applicant may proceed with the project
in accordance. with existing policies, rules and regulations, and subject
to conditions of approval, [that] will strengthen the public planning
process, ... and reduce the economic costs of development.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65864(b) (West 1983); see also supra notes 165-70 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative efforts to confront vested rights problem through statutory enactments).
251. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 232, § 1.1.
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developer, a development agreement augments the property held by
the developer. 252 In other words, the development agreement conveys
a real property interest to the developer. The court's holding in
Mayor oj Rockville v. Walke~5J supports such a construction. In
Walker, the development agreement vested an executory interest in
the municipality. 254
Analogously, Transfer Development Rights (TDRs) provide support for the thesis that the right created by the development agreements is a real property interest. TDRs separate the right to develop
from the bundle of rights a landowner possesses, rendering it a
separable property component.2SS In so doing, statutes that establish
TDRs recognize the right to develop as a distinct property right.2S6
The idea underlying a TDR scheme is that once established as a
discrete right, the right can then be transferred to another piece of
property, and used to increase the development rights for that property.257 Similarly, by vesting a development right in the developer,
development agreements recognize a discrete property right in development.
Finally, commentators have posited that zoning ordinances create
collective public property rights in a particular zoning scheme, which
are vested in the local government. 258 Under this thesis, one might

252. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (contrasting development agreements, which create property rights, with conditional zoning and subdivision
regulations, which do not have same effect); see also P & L Properties, Inc.
v. Schnip Dev. Corp., No. 311354, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3234, at *9
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 1992) ("£TJhe development rights and obligations
arising from the Development Agreement were 'property' .... ") (dicta).
253. 86 Md. App. 691, 587 A.2d 1179 (1991).
254. Id. at 699, 587 A.2d at 1182-83; see also supra notes 42-52 and accompanying
text (discussing Walker in detail).
255. Madelyn Glickfeld, Update on Transfer of Development Rights, in ALI-ABA
LAND USE INST. 1377, 1377 (1989).

256. Id.
257. Id.; see also Norman Marcus, Air Rights In New York City: TDR, Zoning
Lot Merger, and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 867, 870 n.ll
(1984) ("TDR is the term used to describe a variety of techniques that involve
the transfer of air rights from one zoning lot to another that is either contiguous
or non-contiguous to the original lot. ").
.
258. See ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 1 (1977) (defining a property
right as "the authority it creates to control the use of property," and concluding
that zoning serves to divide up control of land uses between private owner and
local government); see also WnLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING
LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ApPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS I,
36 (1985) (examining zoning through application of economic analysis based
on premise that land use controls represent collective property rights, presently
controlled by local government, but opining that market place is most efficient
mechanism for land use decisionmaking); cj. BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., supra
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view the development agreement as transferring the publicly held
zoning property right to the private developer on a conditional
basis.259 The development agreement thus resembles a defeasible
property right in the applicable zoning scheme.
Turning to the classification of the property interest created by
a development agreement, it is clear that it is not perpetuaF60 because
the development agreement itself has a fixed term. 261 Furthermore,
the property right is contingent upon the developer's compliance with
its end of the bargain. 262 As illustrated by the earlier discussion of
Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, a development agreement may impose
a condition on the title of the property, thereby creating a defeasible
estate. 263 In Walker, the development agreement actually affected the
transfer of the subject property and thus, construing the agreement
as creating a defeasible estate seems logical. 264 But even if the
development agreement only creates and conveys a separable property

259.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

note 200, at 8-9 ("A property interest is merely a person's right to have the
benefits of the particular type of interest the person holds in the property. ").
In attempting to provide a legal overview of the constitutional implications
associated with land use regulation, this book indicates that" [t]he application
of zoning and other land use controls by local government affects land, also
known as real property, or more accurately, affects property interest." [d.
The notion that zoning constitutes a property right finds support from the
legal concept of property as a bundle of rights in a piece of land. CUNNINGHAM
ET AL., supra note 232, § 1.1. Zoning severs some of these rights from the
individual property holder, by regulating the use of its property. Arguably
these separate rights are vested in the public, or local government, as the
representative of the people. See generally NELSON, supra (exploring concept
of zoning as property right and consequences resulting from removal from
private domain).
See supra note 252. A development agreement vests in the developer an
entitlement to the benefits of a specified zoning scheme, and thus a particular
use of its property. This entitlement is subject to defeasance, however, in the
event of developer noncompliance with the terms of the agreement. In the
event of noncompliance, the right to control the use of the property reverts
back to the local government. Cj. Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 86 Md. App.
691, 697, 587 A.2d 1179, 1182 (1991) ("[T]he grantor may again acquire [the
estate] for breach of the condition under which it was granted.").
See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (describing character of defeasance
associated with vested right created by development agreement).
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3229 (1993) (limiting duration of development agreements,
but allowing for renewal period following additional public hearings).
See supra notes 204, 221 and accompanying text (discussing issue of noncompliance and statutory provision for unilateral termination or amendment by
.
local government).
See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing court's construction
of agreement in Walker).
Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 86 Md. App. 691, 587 A.2d 1179 (1991).
Analogously, the vested right in development is defeasible. See supra note 221
and accompanying text (discussing statutory provisions for unilateral termination of agreement in event of developer non-compliance).
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right in development, one might construe the conveyance as contingent upon a condition subsequent. 265 This condition would require
that the developer complete or contribute the required exaction. The
problem with the construction of the development agreement as
creating a defeasible property interest, however, is the draconian
consequences of default-the property right is extinguished or forfeited in its entirety.266
Alternatively, the property interest created by a development
agreement resembles something more akin to a real covenant that
runs with the land. 267 There are traditionally four requirements for
a real covenant: (1) a writing; (2) intent; (3) touch and concern;
(4) privity.268 A development agreement easily passes muster under
the first two criteria. First, the development agreement is statutorily
memorialized in writing through the passage of an ordinance. 269 The
1993)

265. Most of the literature available on development agreements is addressed to
their use as vesting mechanisms, by limiting the government's power to subsequently impact project completion, through the enactment of additional
regulatory restrictions. See DEVEWPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note II (providing
numerous essays evaluating and analyzing use of development agreements);
Curtin & Zischke, supra note 155 (considering overview of development agreements as vesting mechanism). As Walker illustrates, however, the development
agreement may go even further and act as a transferring mechanism of publicly
owned property. Walker, 86 Md. App. 691, 587 A.2d 1179; see also Hans
Mattson et aI., Development Agreements For Residential Development in
Sweden, DEVEWPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note II, at 91 (discussing use by
Sweden of development agreement as property-allotment mechanism by which
municipality transfers publicly held land to private developer).
266. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 232, §§ 2.3-2.6.
267. A real covenant is defined as "a covenant the obligation of which is so
connected with the realty that he who has the latter is either entitled to the
benefit of it or is liable to perform it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 364 (6th
ed. 1990).
While this Article argues that the proper construction of the development
agreement is as a real covenant, it acknowledges that the same result could be
reached through a unification of servitude and defeasible fees, as propounded
by a number of scholars. See generally Susan F. French, Toward A Modern
Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261
(1982) (attempting to provide modern framework for analyzing covenant and
associated types of land use controls); Gerald Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes
and Defeasible Fees: Property Law's Functional Equivalents, 66 TEX. L. REv.
533, 536 (1988) ("[C]ondition[s] imposed in a defeasible estate and a servitude
limiting a fee are methods for transferring from the fee owner to another
person a nonpossessory ownership interest in the land burdened by the servitude
or condition.") (footnote omitted); Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept
of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1179 (1982) (discussing different characteristics of and standards applying to equitable servitude, running covenants, and
easements, and arguing persuasively that all should be treated as one concept).
268. CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH THE LAND" 74 (1929).
269. See supra note 262 (requiring that covenant comply with statute of frauds and
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second requirement of "running" intent may be met by a clear recital
and warrant within the covenant that it runs to assignees.270 Thus
the development agreement should include a clause similar to the
following:
All of the covenants, conditions, and obligations contained
in this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the respective assignees of the parties hereto.
The final two requirements are slightly more complex. In order
for a covenant to run with an estate, it must touch and concern the
land.271 Courts have applied a number of tests in determining what
constitutes touch and concern.272 One test examines whether the
covenant increases the value of the landowner's property.273 This
must be determined both in terms of the burden (the promisor) and
the benefit (the promisee).274 Here, the municipality's covenant to
freeze the regulatory scheme clearly touches and concerns the real
estate developer's property. By vesting the right to develop, the.
covenant provides a benefit that increases the legal interest the
developer holds.27S It is less clear, however, whether the burden meets
the touch and concern requirement. The problem is that the government only promises not to change the applicable land use scheme
and, in this respect, the promise from the promisor or burden
perspective does not appear to directly affect the value of any
property. There are two responses to this, however. The first is that
other elements rendering it a binding contract between the parties); see also
supra notes 12, 139, 141, 143 and accompanying text (discussing contractual
nature of development agreements).

270. See CLARK, supra note 268, at 74; see also CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note

271.
272.

273.
274.
275.

232, § 8.16 (stating that careful draftsmen will always include language evincing
intent for covenant to run); cj. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65868 (West 1983) (stating
that agreement may be amended or canceled by parties to agreement or
successors in interest, indicating legislative intent that development agreement
is intended to run to assignees).
See CLARK, supra note 268, at 75.
The question of exactly what constitutes "touch and concern" is perplexing
and unclearly defined. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 232, § 8.15. The test
that reflects the modern trend is that the covenant "operate[s) either to make
more valuable some of the rights, privileges, or powers possessed by the
covenantee or to relieve him in whole or in part of some of his duties." Harry
A. Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639, 645
(1914); see also CLARK, supra note 268, at 97-98 ("[If) the promisee's legal
relations in respect to that land are increased-his legal interest as owner
rendered more valuable by the promise-the benefit of the covenant touches
and concerns the land. ").
See CLARK, supra note 268, at 76 (adopting Professor Bigelow's legal relations
of the parities test for determining whether covenant meets touch and concern
requirement).
See id. at 76.
See supra notes 232-41, 251 and accompanying text.
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it may not be necessary that the burden meet the touch and concern
requirement because in the case of the development agreement only
the benefit need run for it to be enforceable. 276 In the alternative,
one can argue that the burden does touch and concern because it
limits the municipality's property right to a particular zoning ordinance.277 In this case both the burden and the benefit would run and
thus, the development agreement would be enforceable as a real
covenant. 278
The final requirement, privity of estate, has held a variety of
meanings over time. 279 Today, it is commonly accepted a'S only
requiring a succession to one party's estate. 280 Thus, a lender who
forecloses a mortgage and takes title to the developer's property
should qualify for privity of estate and be entitled to enforce the
agreement.
While to date no court has specifically construed development
agreements as real covenants, this seems to be the most appropriate
construction. The language found in California's statutory enabling
act supports such a construction. It states that "[t]he burdens of the
agreement shall be binding upon, and the benefits of the agreement
shall inure to, all successors in interest to the parties to the agreement. "281 British commentators' construction of similar statutorily
based agreements as real covenants, provides further support. 282
Finally, at least one model development agreement form specifically
provides that the provisions of the agreement act as covenants running
with the land. 283 The construction of the development agreement as
a real covenant, which attaches to the estate of the developer, offers
significant benefits in terms .of implementation and enforceability

276. See CLARK, supra note 268, at 80 ("[C]ovenantee's assignee may sue covenantor
when the benefit runs .... ").
277. See supra notes 13, 232-51 and accompanying text.
278. See CLARK, supra note 268, at 80-82.
279. See id. at 91-96. Clark outlines three possible requirements of privity. These
are: "(I) succession to the estate of one of the parties to the covenant ... ;
(2) succession of estate (J between covenantor and covenantee ... ; (3) mutual
and simultaneous interest of the parties in the same land .... " /d. at 91.
280. C/. id. at 91.
281. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868.5 (West 1983) (supporting the requisite intent element
of real covenants).
282. See Stephen Evans, Practical Aspects 0/ Section 52 Agreements 128 SOLIe.
181, 182 (1984) (providing general overview of British equivalent of statutory
enabling legislation for development agreements and stating that such agreements create covenants running with the land); see also Malcolm Grant,
Statutory Development Agreements: The British Experience, DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra note 11, at 77, 81-82 (discussing British experience with
development agreements and critiquing construction as real covenant).
283. Curtin, supra note 146, app. B at 203.
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that are appealing to the lender.284 The primary advantage being that
a real covenant is enforceable by and against assignees to the property
with which it runs.28S
Regardless of its actual construction, it is clear that development
agreements go further than historical subdivision regulations and
conditional zoning because they create property rights. 286 This adds
to the bundle of property rights in the developer's estate and therefore
increases the value of the estate. 287 The developer realizes this increased value through the elimination of the uncertainty posed by a
changing land use regulatory scheme on the real estate development
process and the consequently greater likelihood that it will complete
the proposed development. By injecting certainty into the development process, the agreement decreases the risks to a financier associated with real estate development. Thus, a development agreement
can serve as an effective tool in rendering real estate development
more attractive to financial institutions.

B.

Lenders' Concerns Regarding Drafting of Agreements

Development agreements identify a legal interest in the right of
develo]Jment in property and render that interest a discrete component
of the property. The incorporation of that interest as part of the
collateral for real estate financing resembles real estate component
financing. The lender's concern, in evaluating a loan application
predicated on collateral encompassing a development agreement, will
in turn parallel many of the same concerns associated with leasehold
financing or financing secured by an assignment of rents.288 As
Walker indicates, an improperly structured development agreement
can pose dire consequences to a lender. 289 Similar to a lease, a
development agreement has the power to directly affect the value of
the collateral because it directly implicates the developer's ability to

284. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 218, § 8.13 (indicating that primary benefit
associated with real covenants is enforceability against "remote" parties in
interest).
285. See id.
286. See supra notes 141, 143 and accompanying text (contrasting conditional zoning,
development agreements, and subdivision regulations).
287. See supra notes 13,232-51 and accompanying text (analyzing zoning as collective
property right and indicating that right may be transferred to developer through
development agreement).
288. Cj. supra notes 89-94, 96, 104, 106, 112, 116 and accompanying text (exploring
lender concerns in the area of leasehold financing).
289. Mayor of Rockville v. Walker, 86 Md. App. 691, 691-97, 587 A.2d 1179, 117981 (construing breach of development agreement, by developer as extinguishing
mortgagee's security interest in attendant property).
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complete construction in a timely and cost efficient manner.290 Thus,
the lender will closely examine the agreement because the value of
the collateral property is predicated on project completion and because, in the event of developer default under the mortgage agreement, the lender may step into the shoes of the developer.
The first step in allaying the lender's concerns is the inclusion
of the lender in the original negotiations. 291 This is not always
possible, however, and thus the developer and local government
should attempt to anticipate the potential concerns of a lender in
formulating the initial agreement. While including the lender as a
party to the agreement seems similarly attractive at first glance, such
inclusion may raise the specter of lender liability and should be
approached with caution.292 Inclusion of the lender as an actual party
to the agreement indicates a degree of control over the project that
might lead a court to classify the lender as an owner, operator, or
partner in the development. 293 The classification may result in lender
liability on a variety of grounds. This section provides a discussion
of the terms and structure of the agreement which will most heavily
impact upon the developer's ability to complete construction.
The lender will closely evaluate the terms of the agreement,
seeking to identify any term or condition that will adversely impact

290. This is analogous to the lender's concerns in financing which are predicated
on dedication of income of rents from leases. In such financing, the lender is
concerned with terms that will impact on the continued flow of rents. See
supra notes 89, 96, 104, 106, 112, 116 and accompanying text (discussing such
lender considerations as tenant's financial capacity, level of rent, and term of
lease that indicate potential for continued flow of income from rents servicing
debt). The lender will wish to ensure that the developer will be able to comply
with the terms of the agreement, because failure to do so may terminate the
agreement, thus extinguishing the vested right in development. See supra note
221 and accompanying text (discussing effect of developer noncompliance with
terms of agreement). Furthermore, if the development agreement is construed
as a running covenant, the developer's default on the loan will place the lender
in the developer's shoes. This is analogous to the situation where the developer
defaults in leasehold financing, and the lender steps into its shoes as a tenant.
291. See Joseph E. Coomes, Practical Concerns in Drafting and Negotiating Development Agreements, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 11, at 133,
139 (stating that lenders are generally not familiar with benefits of development
agreement, but potential impact on lender in event of foreclosure, requires that
developer draft an agreement with concern for implications to lender); Evans,
supra note 282, at 182 (stating that mortgagees should be party to § 52
agreement, which is British equivalent of United States development agreement);
cf supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing importance of inclusion of lender in lease negotiation, which will be used as part of security
interest in obtaining financing, but concluding that this may not always be
feasible).
292. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing lender liability).
293. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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on project completion. First, the lender will seek to ensure that the
agreement provides sufficient duration to enable the developer to
complete the proposed development as well as any required exaction
under the terms of the agreement. 294 A definite duration term also
undermines any constitutional attack on the basis that the development agreement violates the reserved powers doctrine and thus, is
void.29S Such a term helps to ensure the agreement's validity.
The exaction on which the agreement is predicated will also be
of concern to a lender. The requirements placed on the developer by
the exaction place additional costs on the development process. 296
The developer should incorporate these costs into the calculation of
its financing needs and take them into account when determining the
total costs and value of the project. Furthermore, the feasibility of
the exaction's completion should be considered. Central to the enforceability of the development agreement is the developer's compliance with its end of the bargain. 297 Thus, the exaction should not
overburden the developer and threaten the success of the project.
Clearly, at a minimum, the increased value of the property based on
the vested development right should equal the increased costs associated with the exaction. Ideally, the property right created by the
agreement will enhance the project's value by more than the costs
of the exaction.
The developer's compliance with the terms of the exaction is
integral to the continuing existence of the property right created by
the development agreement. 298 Thus, the terms that define events
constituting breach of conditions of noncompliance and those that
294. See Coomes, supra note 291, at 137, 138 (indicating that developer's interest
dictates that the agreement provide for the longest term possible, often linked
to period of financing, and that present practice is to specify such a term
between 10 and 25 years). Without sufficient time to complete the development,
the agreement's vesting of development rights is more illusory than real. The
lender's concern with the duration of the agreement and the developer's ability
to complete the project is analogous to the lender's concerns in leasehold
financing as to the duration of the lease. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (indicating that insufficient duration of lease term minimizes value
of lease as security to lender).
295. See supra notes 27, 172, 179 and accompanying text (exploring reserved powers
doctrine and application to development agreements). The longer the duration
of the agreement, the more likely a court will construe the agreement as an
illegal bargaining away of the police power, thus voiding the agreement.
Coomes, supra note 291, at 138.
296. See supra notes 5, 7, 9, IS, 81, 82, 86, 135 and accompanying text (discussing
cost of exactions and evaluating who actually bears increased costs).
297. See supra notes 24, 220, 236, 240 and accompanying text (discussing remedies
and implications of agreement's breach).
298. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing effect of noncompliance
as termination of agreement and voiding of vested right).
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identify corresponding remedies will also be important to the lender. 299
Several statutes already provide for the remedy of specific performance, however, the agreement should expressly identify this remedy. 300
Furthermore, the lender will require that it be given notice of any
default by the developer. 301 The development agreement should entitle
the lender to cure any defects with the terms of the agreement before
allowing the local government to take action amending or terminating
the agreement.
The development agreement should expressly delineate the nature
of the benefit to both parties. The parties should draft this clause
in such a way as to make clear that it touches and concerns the
land. 302 This will aid in the development agreement's assignability
and construction as a real covenant. The drafter might use such
language as:

The benefit to Developer under this Agreement consists of
the vesting of the right to develop its property according to
[reference description of premises annex], and exempting
the development from application of any subsequently enacted incompatible regulations or ordinances.
Furthermore, the agreement should clearly identify the applicable
regulations and ordinances in effect at the time of the agreement. 303
Such a delineation might be encompassed in an annex to the agree299. See Coomes, supra note 291, at 145-46 (stating that agreement should comprehensively address requirements of annual review provision and issue of
default, remedies, and termination of agreement).
300. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text (delineating statutorily delineated
remedies); see also Coomes, supra note 291, at 145 (identifying specific performance as preferred remedy).
301. See Coomes, supra note 291, at 145 ("All parties should receive notice of
review and opportunity to respond to any charges that might lead to default. ");
cf. supra notes 89, 96, 104, 106, 112, 116 and accompanying text (noting that
lender will require such notice and opportunity to address issue of default
within context of subdivision regulation exactions).
302. See supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
303. See Coomes, supra note 291, at 140-41 (discussing importance of precision in
delineating extent of rights which vest). This is similar to the lender's concern
with operating covenants in the area of leasehold financing. See supra note
105 and accompanying text (discussing lender concern with operating covenants
of lease, as impacting on value of lease). As has already been indicated, the
regulatory scheme is only frozen as to the regulations delineated by the
agreement. Any subsequent regulations which do not directly conflict with the
delineated terms of the agreement, are enforceable against the developer. See
supra note 218 and accompanying text (providing statutory basis for this
conclusion); see also Fitzg~rald & Peiser, supra note 31, at 43-44 (discussing
problems resulting from Colorado Place development agreement, and subsequent renegotiation of terms of agreement, despite developer contentions that
proposed development was authorized by terms of initial agreement).
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ment, but should be clearly referenced within the agreement itself.
The more specific and detailed the agreement, the less opportunity
there will be for subsequent dissent over the governing land use
scheme.
As has already been noted, the developer should encourage the
lender's input during negotiations to ensure that the agreement is
drafted in a manner consistent with the lender's concerns. This leaves
open the question of whether the parties to the agreement should
solely consist of the developer and municipality or whether other
parties should be joined. Wherever possible, it is advisable to include
all third party governmental or quasi-public bodies that might wield
regulatory power affecting the development. 304 This would include
state and federal agencies such as coastal commissions or environmental protection groups. Without the inclusion of such bodies as
parties to the agreement, the regulatory freeze provision may be
ineffective in ensuring the developer's right to develop because. the
developer will be subject to any subsequent regulatory requirement
promulgated by such a group.30S The case of Avco Community
Developers v. South Carolina Regional Commission 306 illustrates such
a scenario. In Avco, even if the developer and local government had
entered into a development agreement, the failure to join the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, a state agency, to
the agreement would have been fatal to the developer's project. 307
The fact that state enabling statutes provide that any such agreement
is subject to amendment in order to comply with any subsequent
state or federal law, or regulation reinforces this point. 30s While

304. See Marsh, supra note 187, at 159 (proposing that development agreements be
used in multi-agency/multi-interest developments). Marsh uses the example of
the San Bruno Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan Agreement to illustrate
the desirability and mechanics of multi-agency agreements. See id. at 160-62
(stating that parties to this agreement included "three cities, a county, two
state park and wildlife agencies, the federal wildlife agency, and a number of
landowners and developers. ").
305. See Coomes, supra note 291, at 142 (identifying potential enactment of state
or federal law or regulation that interferes with vested right as problematic
from developer's viewpoint, and stating that developer may require ability to
negotiate with or seek other manner of complying with regulation, thus avoiding
automatic voidance of agreement).
306. 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
307. [d. See also Marsh, supra note 13, at 3.
308. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65869.5 (West 1983) (providing for modification or
suspension of agreement in event of preemptive law by federal or state
legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.32~1 (West 1994). For a case illustrating
the potential impact which federally enacted legislation may have on the
development process, see Board of County Supervisors of Prince William
County v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 205 (1991) (evaluating claim of developer
to vested right of development under local rezoning preempted by enactment
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inclusion of all regulatory bodies is encouraged, it is not necessarily
fatal to the success of the agreement. This is true for two reasons.
First, the bulk of zoning and land use regulation is primarily a
function of local government, thus the municipality is still the primary
party that the developer should seek to bind. 309 Second, if the
development agreement is viewed as creating and conveying a property right, as posited in this Article, one can argue that the application
of any post agreement regulation to the project affects a taking of
this property interest and is thus subject to takings analysis.
One final concern to the lender is the extent to which the property
right created and conveyed by the development agreement inures to
the developer's estate and thus becomes assignable to subsequent
holders of the estate. An assurance of assignability and the closely
related concept of enforceability is essential in the event the developer
subsequently defaults on the loan, forcing the lender to intervene
and take title to the property. The final section of this Article
addresses this need for assignability and enforceability of the development agreement as an essential attribute in rendering the agreement
a viable financing device.
C. Assignability and Enforceability of the Development
Agreement
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the development agreement
in protecting all of the relevant parties' interests, a viable enforcement
and assignment mechanism must be provided. This is most efficiently
accomplished through a construction of the development· agreement
as a real covenant. The advantage of this construction is that the
covenant attaches to the developer's estate and thus is enforceable
by and against subsequent assignees of the property. 310
of the Manassas National Battlefield Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 429(b) (1988),
which provided for eminent domain proceeding over developer's property). The
court in Prince William specifically stated that the zoning ordinance was not
enforceable against the United States. Prince William, 23 Cl. Ct. at 209 n.2.
309. See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 20, § 3.6.
310. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 232, § 8.13 (contrasting the difference
between a pure contractual covenant and a real covenant. Real covenant rights
and benefits do not require express assignment, but rather travel with land or
estate, and thus bind remote parties who acquire interest in burdened and
benefitted land); Coomes, supra note 291, at 19 (contrasting developer's wish
to ensure assignability of agreement, with local government's concern with
effect of unfettered assignability and concluding that any restraints on alienability must be rationally related to public objective); see also Curtin & Skaggs,
supra note 193, at 127-29 (evaluating application of doctrine against restraints
on alienation as applied to development agreements, and indicating that limited
interest created may not be subject to doctrine, but also stating that legislative
intent seems to link agreement to land and indicate intent that agreement be
transferable).
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If the agreement is used as an instrument to secure the financing
for the proposed project, the rights under the agreement must be
assignable to the lender. This is because the essential value of the
development agreement is its conveyance of a property right in
development, which in turn provides for greater certainty and predictability in the construction process and completion of the project.
Thus, in the event of foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure,
assignability will enable the lender to realize the full value of the
collatera1. 31l In addition, if the lender opts for a workout, regardless
of whether it is with the original developer or someone else, it is
assured that development will proceed according to plan without the
imposition of new or changed land use restrictions.
The agreement must be structured so that it complies with the
relevant common law requirements for enforcement as a real covenant.312 The development agreement should include clear warranties
and recitals that it acts as a real covenant. Thus, the agreement
should clearly identify the benefit to be provided as well as the
assignable nature of the right bestowed.313 Furthermore, the agreement should be recorded and made public as an encumbrance on the
title.
The agreement might also include a provision similar to an
attornment clause used in assignment of rents financing. 314 Such a
clause would consist of an agreement by the municipality to allow
the lender to enforce the agreement against it. Thus, the agreement
might contain language similar to the following:

[The municipality] agrees that if the interest of the Developer
in the Premises are transferred or assigned to the Lender
by reason of foreclosure or other proceedings brought by it
(for purposes of this paragraph, the term "Lender" shall
be deemed to include any grantee of lender or purchaser at
foreclosure sale), [the municipality] shall be bound to Lender
under all of the terms, covenants, and conditions of the
Agreement for the duration thereof. [The municipality] does
hereby attorn to Lender, as developer, said attornment to
be effective and self-operative without the execution of any
311. See supra notes 89, 117-36 and accompanying text (discussing lender options
and issues of concern in event of borrower default and stressing that developer
will do everything in its power to complete development).
312. See supra notes 259-72 and accompanying text (delineating common law requirements of real covenants and evaluating development agreements ability to
conform to requirements).
313. See supra notes 259-72 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 89, 96, 104, 106, 112, 116 (identifying attornment and nondisturbance provisions as potential clauses required by lender in lease).
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further instruments on the part of any of the parties hereto
immediately upon Lender succeeding to the interest of the
Developer in the premises. 31S
The lender's interest in ensuring the inurement and assignability
of the agreement may conflict with the local government's desire to
maintain some degree of quality control over the project's development. 316 This need not necessarily be a stumbling block because the
local government's interest in an efficiently completed, high quality
development project, substantially coincides with the lender's interest
in completion. 317 The lender, itself, will act as assurance that the
project will be completed under the terms of the agreement.
In conclusion, it is clear that if the development agreement is
to serve as a financing mechanism for real estate development, the
property right created must inure and be assignable with its corresponding estate. The most viable mechanism for accomplishing this
is for the development agreement to be drafted and treated as a real
covenant, thus rendering it enforceable by subsequent assignees of
the developer, including the lender in the event of foreclosure or a
deed in lieu of foreclosure.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The real estate development process is one fraught with risk to
the unwary lender. An increasingly complex regulatory process poses
one of the chief threats to a project's completion. Failure to complete
a project may substantially impair the value of the property serving
as collateral as well as deprive the developer of the means with which
to repay the lender. Development agreements, by creating and conveying a vested right in development, inject a greater degree of

315. C/. Welborn, supra note 107, at 26-32 (providing model attornment provisions,
from which this proposed language is adopted).
316. See Curtin & Skaggs, supra note 193, at 127-28 (indicating that municipality
may be reluctant to allow for free transferability of agreement by developer,
motivated by desire to maintain some control over who develops project, and
protect development from unreliable developer).
317. The lender's primary concern will be an efficient and proper completion of
the proposed development, because this may very likely be the only way in
which it may recover 'its loan. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
(discussing lender's interest in project completion in avoidance of material
impairment of collateral). Furthermore, the lender may face liability for an
improperly completed building, and thus will wish to insure proper completion.
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing lender liability under
common law tort doctrine).
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stability and predictability into a typically unstable process. The
property right conveyed by the agreement should provide an added
incentive to a lender's involvement in the real estate financing process.
The agreement conveys a property interest in development, increasing
the value of the collateral that is available to secure financing. In
order for the development agreement to effectively accomplish this,
it is essential that the agreement be structured in such a fashion as
to address the lender's concerns. This Article identifies some of these
concerns and provides a general outline of the issues that the parties
should address in the development agreement. Finally, this Article
asserts that the development agreement may best accomplish this
purpose through its construction as a real covenant, thus providing
for enforcement and assignability to the lender and subsequent assignees.

